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HOISTING ORIGINALITY
Joseph Scott Miller*

ABSTRACT**

What looms behind the door marked ―originality‖ is a question that
is rarely acknowledged by courts and never definitively answered:
what exactly is the purpose of copyright law? What values are we
protecting and why?
—Diane L. Zimmerman1
* Associate Professor, Lewis & Clark Law School.
Comments are welcome at
getmejoemiller@gmail.com. Thanks to Lydia Loren and Tomás Gómez-Arostegui for an
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I. FOUR PHOTOS AND A LAWSUIT
―Progress.‖ ―Hope.‖ Shepard Fairey used these words as part of
the now-familiar posters he created for President Barack Obama‘s
groundbreaking 2008 presidential campaign.2 But Fairey used more
than words: the iconic posters include an image of then-Senator
Obama‘s face stylized, like the rest of the posters, in red, white, and
blue tones. Images of the posters, taken from Fairey‘s recent
declaratory judgment complaint against the Associated Press,3 appear
below.

Fairey had long said he began creating the works with a photo,
found through a Google search, as a visual reference: ―Fairey begins
with a news photograph of Obama, grabbed from Google images. He
wants his Obama ‗wise but not intimidating.‘‖4 It was not clear,
however, which particular photo Fairey had used.

invigorating chatloquium in February 2008; to Christian Turner for many lively conversations; to
Mike Madison, Oskar Liivak, Bob Brauneis, and Tim Holbrook for cutting through an early
draft‘s clutter with sharp questions; to Graeme Dinwoodie and others at the Spring 2009 Chicago
IP Colloquium at Kent Law School for a forceful, friendly debate; and to Jim Gibson, Bobbi
Kwall, and Justin Hughes for a challenging online symposium hosted by the University of
Richmond
Law
School‘s
Intellectual
Property
Institute
(available
at
http://blog.richmond.edu/ipi/article-1/).
* * This word cloud was produced using a function available at http://www.wordle.net/.
1 Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, It’s an Original!(?): In Pursuit of Copyright’s Elusive
Essence, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187 (2005).
2 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 16-17, Fairey v. Associated
Press, No. 09-01123 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 9, 2009), available at http://cyberlaw.
stanford.edu/node/6061 (follow ―Read the full complaint here‖ hyperlink).
3 Id. at Exs. B (―Obama Progress‖), C (―Obama Hope‖).
4 William Booth, Street Artist Fairey Gives Obama a Line of Cred, WASHINGTONPOST.COM,
May 18, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/artsandliving/style/features/2008/obamaposter-051808/graphic.html.
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James Danziger, a former photography director for the London
Sunday Times Magazine, reported his take on the mystery on January
19, 2009, the day before President Obama‘s inauguration. Writing in
the online magazine The Daily Beast, Danziger first described his own
curiosity about the photo Fairey referenced:
My search began last fall, when I recognized that Fairey‘s prints
were becoming the definitive visual of the campaign, and I began
asking everyone from Amanda Fairey, the artist‘s wife, to Holly
Hughes, the editor of Photo District News, if they knew who took the
original photo. No one could seem to pin it down. Shepard Fairey
was on record as saying it came from a Google Image search, but
couldn‘t (or wouldn‘t) track it back to the source.5

Danziger then reported that, by posting an inquiry on his blog, The
Year in Pictures,6 he had learned from ―a computer programmer named
Mike Cramer‖ that—according to Cramer—Fairey‘s posters referenced
a photo from a 2007 story at Time.com.7 Danziger, digging further,
discovered that Time.com had miscredited the 2007 photo; eventually,
however, Danziger tracked the photo on which Cramer had relied to
Reuters photographer Jim Young.8 Here it is:

The story does not end there, however, because Young‘s photo is
not the one Fairey referenced.

5 James Danziger, The Obama HOPE Photo Mystery Continues!, DAILY BEAST, Jan. 19,
2009,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-01-19/who-took-the-presidentialcampaigns-most-famous-photo/full/.
6 See The Year in Pictures, Will the Photographer Who Took the Image This Illustration Is
Based on Please Stand Up?, http://pictureyear.blogspot.com/2009/01/will-photographer-whotook-image-this.html (Jan. 14, 2009, 8:51 AM).
7 Danziger, supra note 5. Cramer posted his visual explanation for his deduction on Flickr,
the photo-sharing web site. See Flickr, Obama ―Hope‖ Source, http://www.flickr.com/photos/
mikewebkist/3197414552/ (Jan. 14, 2009).
8 Danziger, supra note 5. Young took the photo at a Senate confirmation hearing. Id.

JOE.MILLER.31-2

454

1/5/2010 10:48 AM

C A R D OZ O LA W R E V I E W

[Vol. 31:2

Tom Gralish, a general assignment photographer for the
Philadelphia Inquirer, continued the story in a series of posts on his
blog, Scene on the Road.9 Gralish first reported that, according to
commenter Steve Simula, an Associated Press photo from 2006 was a
much closer source for the Fairey posters than Jim Young‘s photo for
Reuters.10 Hours later, Gralish reported finding the precise AP photo
that Simula had identified—a photo credited to Mannie Garcia and to
the AP, which Garcia had taken at an April 2006 National Press Club
event about Darfur.11 Gralish also included another photo Garcia had
taken at the Press Club event, this one including actor George Clooney
seated to then-Senator Obama‘s right.12 Here they are, taken from the
AP‘s recently filed answer and counterclaims against Fairey, including
the labels the AP gave them in that pleading13:

News reports in early February 2009 suggested that the AP and
Fairey were talking about the legal upshot, if any, of these events.14
9 See Scene on the Road, http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/inq-on-the-road/. At the time
Gralish wrote about the Fairey posters, his blog had a different URL:
http://blogs.phillynews.com/inquirer/sceneonroad/.
10 Scene
on the Road, Another (Better?) Obama Poster Source Photo,
http://blogs.phillynews.com/inquirer/sceneonroad/2009/01/new_obamashepard_fairey_source
_1.html (Jan. 20, 2009, 8:47 PM). Simula, like Cramer, posted his visual explanation for his
deduction on a Flickr page.
See Flickr, Fairey Poster Photo Source?,
http://www.flickr.com/photos/
25105505@N07/3212113517/ (Jan. 20, 2009). Simula‘s work is brilliant; please visit it.
11 Scene
on
the
Road,
Found–AGAIN–The
Poster
Source
Photo,
http://blogs.phillynews.com/inquirer/sceneonroad/2009/01/found_again_the_poster_source.html
(Jan. 21, 2009, 3:24 AM).
12 Id.
13 Answer ¶¶ 54, 142, Fairey v. Associated Press, No. 09-01123 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 11,
2009), available at http://www.ap.org/iprights/Answer_and_Counterclaims_of_Associated_
Press.pdf.
14 National Public Radio, Fair Use or Infringement? Obama Image in Spat,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=100301384 (Feb. 5, 2009).
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Talks, it appears, failed: Fairey filed a declaratory judgment suit against
the AP on February 9, alleging noninfringement. On March 11, the AP
filed counterclaims. Fairey contended that he used, as his point of
departure for the posters, the Garcia photo containing both Obama and
Clooney.15 The AP contended that Fairey used the Garcia photo
containing Obama alone.16 More recently, Fairey has conceded that,
just as the AP maintained, he used the Garcia photo of Obama alone as
his reference.17
The central thrust of Fairey‘s noninfringement claim is fair use,18 a
longstanding defense codified in the Copyright Act.19
Internet
commentary on the dispute has also focused on the fair use doctrine.20
Indeed, Danziger‘s Daily Beast story highlighted the concept: ―Like it
or not, Fairey‘s use of the picture is well within the parameters of
what‘s considered ‗fair use.‘‖21 One need not reach the fair use
question at all, however, if the expression Fairey copied from Garcia‘s
photo is not protected by copyright.
How could that be? ―To establish infringement, two elements must
be proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of

15
16
17

Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 14, 18.
Answer, supra note 13, ¶¶ 142-143, 164.
Motion to Amend Pleadings at 3, Fairey v. Associated Press, No. 09-01123 (S.D.N.Y. filed
Oct. 16, 2009), available at http://www.ap.org/iprights/fairey.html (follow ―Fairey Motion to
Amend Pleadings‖ hyperlink) (―On October 2, 2009, counsel for Plaintiffs learned new
information revealing that Plaintiffs‘ assertions were incorrect. Mr. Fairey was apparently
mistaken about the photograph he used when his original complaint for declaratory relief was
filed on February 9, 2009. After the original complaint was filed, Mr. Fairey realized his mistake.
Instead of acknowledging that mistake, Mr. Fairey attempted to delete the electronic files he had
used in creating the illustration at issue. He also created, and delivered to his counsel for
production, new documents to make it appear as though he had used the Clooney photograph as
his reference.‖).
18 Complaint, supra note 2, ¶¶ 44-50; see also Shepard Fairey, The AP, Obama, and
Referencing, HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 26, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shepardfairey/the-ap-obama-referencing_b_179562.html (―But the photograph is just a starting point.
The illustration transforms it aesthetically in its stylization and idealization, and the poster has an
altogether different purpose than the photograph does. . . . My Obama poster variations of
‗HOPE‘ and ‗PROGRESS‘ were obviously not intended to report the news. I created them to
generate support for Obama; the point was to capture and synthesize the qualities that made him a
leader. The point of the poster is to convince and inspire. It‘s a political statement. My Obama
poster does not compete with the intent of, or the market for the reference photo.‖).
19 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). See generally Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach
to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004).
20 See, e.g., Mike Madison, Fairey, Obama, and Fair Use, MADISONIAN.net, Jan. 21, 2009,
http://madisonian.net/2009/01/21/fairey-obama-and-fair-use/; Erick Schonfeld, Once Again, the
AP Tries to Redefine Fair Use; Goes After Shepard Fairey for Obama Poster, TECHCRUNCH,
Feb. 5, 2009, http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/02/05/once-again-the-ap-tries-to-redefine-fairuse-goes-after-shepard-fairey-for-obama-poster/; Daniel Solove, Is the Obama Poster a
Copyright
Violation?,
CONCURRING
OPINIONS,
Feb.
5,
2009,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/
archives/2009/02/is_the_obama_po.html. I suspect I could list a great many more such examples.
21 Danziger, supra note 5.
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constituent elements of the work that are original.‖22 And the
conventional copyright view is that photographs are copyrightable,23
due in part to how low copyright‘s originality threshold is taken to be.24
What I am struck by, however, is how conventional—how uncreative—
the Garcia photos of the Press Club event are. I find them pleasing, to
be sure, and they seem well-composed and clear; anyone who uses them
should, I think, credit Garcia with having taken them. They accurately
convey a moment that took place at the press event they record.
Photojournalism‘s high professional standards doubtless encourage just
this type of accurate, anodyne, conventional presentation.25 But
―original‖? If conventional copyright doctrine tells us these photos are
sufficiently original to earn the strong exclusion rights that copyright
provides, so much the worse—in my view—for copyright law.
Inauguration Day events brought another, more whimsical
photographic comparison. On the parade route back to the White
House, the President and the First Lady spent some of their time
walking along the route, free of the limousine cocoon. Doug Mills, a
New York Times photographer, snapped a cheerful photo of the Obamas
as they walked in the parade. Hendrik Hertzberg, a senior editor at the
New Yorker magazine, recalled the Mills photo‘s similarity to another
photo—this one, an album cover from forty-six years earlier. Happily
for Hertzberg, and his blog readers, both the album cover image and the
Mills photo were readily available online. Here is Hertzberg‘s blog
entry from January 22, 200926:

22 Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (concluding that a
copier was not liable for copyright infringement because the material it copied—a set of white
pages phone number listings—did not meet the constitutionally-required minimum level of
originality).
23 Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1073-77 (9th Cir. 2000); Rogers v. Koons,
960 F.2d 301, 306-07 (2d Cir. 1992); SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d
301, 306-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 2.08(E)(1), at 2-129 (2009) (―[A]ny (or . . . almost any) photograph may claim the
necessary originality to support a copyright merely by virtue of the photographers‘ personal
choice of subject matter, angle of photograph, lighting, and determination of the precise time
when the photograph is to be taken.‖).
24 See Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1076 (―[T]o overcome the presumption of validity, defendants
must demonstrate why the photographs are not copyrightable. This they have failed to do,
primarily because the degree of originality required for copyrightability is minimal.‖); Rogers,
960 F.2d at 307 (―But the quantity of originality that need be shown is modest—only a dash of it
will do.‖).
25 See, e.g., BRIAN HORTON, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS PHOTOJOURNALISM STYLEBOOK
(1990); MARTIN KEENE, PRACTICAL PHOTOJOURNALISM: A PROFESSIONAL GUIDE (2d ed.
1995); KENNETH KOBRE, PHOTOJOURNALISM: THE PROFESSIONALS‘ APPROACH (2d ed. 1991).
26 See Henrik Hertzberg, Positively Pennsylvania Avenue, NEW YORKER, Jan. 22, 2009,
available
at
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/hendrikhertzberg/2009/01/positivelypenn.html.
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I cannot help but wonder: Did Doug Mills ever see the Dylan
album cover? If he did, was he copying the photo of Dylan when he
snapped the photo of the Obamas? Indeed, if Mills had seen the album
cover, how could he prove he wasn’t copying it when he took that photo
of the Obamas? The mind reels.
II. A HIGHER THRESHOLD
[I]t goes a bit far to deny that genius ever exists. Artists do, at times,
exceed conventions, and new things occasionally arise. Yet, the
point here is that copyright law does not require genius as the
foundation for protection.27
With greater rights come more stringent requirements for obtaining
the rights.28

Copyright is everywhere. So is infringement. Indeed, we are an
―infringement nation,‖29 covered in a billowing white goo of copyright
27 David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and Originality, 38 HOUS.
L. REV. 1, 185 (2001).
28 John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1,
10 (2007).
29 John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007
UTAH L. REV. 537, 543 (―We are, technically speaking, a nation of constant infringers.‖); see also
Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617, 617 (2008) (―Copyrighted works are today
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entanglements.30 Are we well served, today, by the conventional view31
that copyright‘s statutory originality threshold is extremely low? The
antebellum federal courts appear, at least on occasion, to have viewed
copyright‘s creativity threshold as akin to that of patent law.32 In this
essay, I urge we return to something closer to that state of affairs.
Copyright did not always permeate our daily lives so thoroughly.
Copyright‘s current sweep results from at least three decades of
significant expansion along both legal and technological dimensions, as
a number of scholars have described in detail.33 Copyright laws now
seem designed to catch up as much expressive material as possible, no
matter how trivial or pedestrian: copyright attaches at the moment
―original‖ expression is ―fixed in any tangible medium of expression,‖34
without any need to first comply with a notice requirement or other
formality.35 The legal wrong at the heart of copyright—unauthorized
copying—is easier to prove than one might imagine: unconscious

used in many ways they once were not. There is a giant ‗grey zone‘ in copyright, consisting of
millions of usages that do not fall into a clear category but are often infringing. These usages run
the gauntlet, from powerpoint presentations, personal web sites, social networking sites, church
services, and much of wikipedia‘s content to well-known fan guides.‖) (footnote omitted).
30 Jessica Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 587, 596 (2008) (―Bounded
copyright rights have flowed out all over the place like so much frozen yogurt until the terrain is
completely covered by billowing white goo. What used to be five or six discrete exclusive rights
is morphing into an all-purpose general use right, and our understanding of copyright is evolving
into the view that any use of a copyrighted work that is not authorized by the copyright owner or
the statute is infringement.‖).
31 See, e.g., Yurman Designs, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 109 (2d Cir. 2001).
32 Compare Jollie v. Jacque, 13 F. Cas. 910, 913 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7437) (Nelson, J.)
(―The original air requires genius for its construction; but a mere mechanic in music, it is said,
can make the adaptation or accompaniment.‖), with Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.)
248, 267 (1850) (Nelson, J.) (―[U]nless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of
fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application of it to the clay or porcelain
knob than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an
absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every
invention.‖). See also The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (stating that ―originality is
required‖ to earn protection both for patentable inventions and for copyrightable writings);
Bullinger v. Mackey, 4 F. Cas. 649, 653 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 2,127) (stating that a plaintiff
asserting copyright in a compilation‘s arrangement of material ―must make it appear that his book
exhibits a substantially new and original system of arranging material of that character, which
system was his own invention‖).
33 In addition to Tehranian, supra note 29; Wu, supra note 29; and Litman, supra note 30; see
JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND (2008),
especially chapter 3; NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT‘S PARADOX (2008), especially
chapter 4; and Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871 (2007).
34 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
35 David Nimmer lucidly details this expansive range of copyright coverage, with ―protection
[that] applies equally to works of ‗high authorship‘ and to works of emphatically ‗low
authorship.‘‖ David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship and Originality, 38
HOUS. L. REV. 1, 177, 177-85 (2001) (using a series of telescoped pyramid figures to canvass
copyright‘s expansive scope).

JOE.MILLER.31-2

2009]

1/5/2010 10:48 AM

HO I S TI N G OR I GI N A LI TY

459

copying is actionable,36 and ubiquitous network connectivity can make
it easier than ever to show—relying on the fact of widespread
dissemination37—that an accused infringer had access to a given
copyrighted work.38 Indeed, technological change is as much a part of
copyright‘s conquest of daily life as any legal rule. Low-cost computers
(with word processing, e-mail, photo, music, drawing, and browsing
applications) linked to a global, high-speed communications network
routinely transform us into gushing copyright and infringement
fountains.39
Numerous scholars have proposed legal changes to restrain, or
better manage, copyright‘s now-daunting scope. Some have proposed
new approaches to copyright‘s infringement doctrines, urging that we
tighten or refocus the ―substantial similarity‖ inquiry;40 better sensitize
the fair use inquiry to key incentives and market conditions;41 trim the

36 Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 483-84 (9th Cir. 2000); ABKCO Music,
Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 997-98 (2d Cir. 1983); Fred Fisher, Inc. v.
Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (Hand, L.). For a spirited analysis of the
unconscious copying doctrine, see Christopher Brett Jaeger, Note, “Does That Sound
Familiar?”: Creators’ Liability for Unconscious Copyright Infringement, 61 VAND. L. REV.
1903 (2008).
37 See, e.g., Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 270 (2d Cir. 2001) (―Access may be
established directly or inferred from the fact that a work was widely disseminated or that a party
had a reasonable possibility of viewing the prior work.‖); Three Boys Music, 212 F.3d at 482
(―Circumstantial evidence of reasonable access is proven in one of two ways: (1) a particular
chain of events is established between the plaintiff‘s work and the defendant‘s access to that work
(such as through dealings with a publisher or record company), or (2) the plaintiff‘s work has
been widely disseminated.‖).
38 See Ann Bartow, Copyrights and Creative Copying, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 75, 83-84
(2003-04) (―[T]he interests of creative people are somewhat compromised by the voluminous
flow of information facilitated by the internet. This is because if access to a work is proven or
demonstrably likely, the degree of similarity required to constitute copyright infringement is
lessened, and the internet often provides excellent access.‖).
39 See James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 214-15
(2005) (―[T]he everyday use of computer technology routinely results in unauthorized
reproduction, adaptation, distribution, performance, and display of digitized content. Several
courts have held, for example, that loading a program or file into a computer‘s active RAM
memory constitutes copying for the purposes of copyright law . . . . Under these holdings, every
time a copyrighted work is so much as viewed on a computer screen, the viewer needs either the
permission of the copyright holder or the protection of a privilege—even if the disk or file from
which the image is summoned was made with the copyright owner‘s permission and was lawfully
purchased. Even if RAM copies do not implicate copyright‘s exclusive rights, a host of other
common computer activity does, from forwarding e-mail, backing up data, and printing a hard
copy of an online document to caching frequently accessed files, cataloging Internet sites, and
webcasting one‘s travels.‖ (footnotes omitted)); see also BOYLE, supra note 33, at 51; JESSICA
LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 178 (2001).
40 See Bartow, supra note 38, at 92-102; Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope’s Copyright? Aligning
Incentives With Reality By Using Creative Motivation to Shape Copyright Protection, 69 LA. L.
REV. 1, 36-38 (2008).
41 See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L.R.
969 (2007); Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of Piracy,
Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993, 1076-82 (2006); Loren, supra
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copyright owner‘s right to control the preparation of derivative works;42
or profoundly restructure copyright as an unfair competition regime.43
These proposals, with their enforcement focus, do not reduce the sheer
number of copyrighted works. Other scholars tackle the question at the
front end, proposing that we restore formalities that would forestall
copyright rights from attaching in the first place,44 or develop an
explicit, minimum-size principle that defines a copyrightable ―work,‖45
the statutory unit of protection.46 Still others—most notably, the
Creative Commons project and the Free Software Foundation‘s General
Public License—create tools that enable authors to signal clearly to
others that they have a more modest set of enforcement intentions than
copyright‘s defaults provide.47
It is interesting, however, that no one has explored in detail using
copyright‘s central sine qua non, originality,48 as a policy lever with
which to slow the accumulation of copyrighted works by raising the
originality hurdle. This gap in copyright commentary is all the more
curious because, even after the Supreme Court‘s definitive tug upward
on originality‘s constitutional minimum in Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Service Co. (reasserting a creativity component to

note 40, at 38-40; Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L.
REV. 1483 (2007); Wu, supra note 29, at 630-33.
42 See Lydia Pallas Loren, The Changing Nature of Derivative Works in the Face of New
Technologies, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 57, 76-92 (2000); Wu, supra note 29, at 630-33.
43 Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19, 41
(1996) (proposing ―recasting copyright as an exclusive right of commercial exploitation,‖ such
that ―[m]aking money (or trying to) from someone else‘s work without permission would be
infringement, as would large scale interference with the copyright holders‘ opportunities to do
so‖); Sara K. Stadler, Copyright as Trade Regulation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 927-42 (2007). In
a sense, Professor Bohannan‘s ―copyright harm‖ approach to fair use partakes of this unfair
competition spirit as well. See Bohannan, supra note 41.
44 See Gibson, supra note 39, at 221-29; Chris Sprigman, Reform(Aliz)ing Copyright, 57
STAN. L. REV. 485 (2004).
45 Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 575
(2005).
46 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
47 On the Creative Commons, see BOYLE, supra note 33, at ch. 8 (describing the Creative
Commons project). Boyle was a founding member of the Creative Commons and was on the
board
until
April
2009.
Id.
at
ix;
James
Boyle—CC
Network,
https://creativecommons.net/jdaboyle (last visited Oct. 11, 2009). On the General Public License,
and free and open source software more generally, see YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF
NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM ch. 3 (2006).
48 Statements of originality‘s core status are legion. For a concise example, see Leon R.
Yankwich, Originality in the Law of Intellectual Property (Its Meaning from a Legal and Literary
Standpoint), 11 F.R.D. 457, 457 (1951): ―[O]riginality is at the basis of the recognition of the
rights of the author. It is the measure and boundary of protection.‖ According to his Federal
Judicial Center biography, Judge Yankwich served as a U.S. District Court judge from 1935 to
1975. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDGES OF THE U.S. COURTS, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/
tGetInfo?jid=2670 (last visited Sept. 14, 2009).
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originality),49 many courts continue to treat the statutory originality
requirement as decidedly low.50 The two need not be the same, and
there is certainly ample room to hoist statutory originality‘s creativity
requirement higher.
Perhaps a fog remains of the widespread pre-Feist belief that
originality meant only the absence of copying from another.51 As
Professor Litman showed, when originality means only ―not copied
from someone else,‖ it is difficult to take the notion seriously, much less
expect it to mark the copyrightability boundary crisply52: ―[T]he very
act of authorship in any medium is more akin to translation and
recombination than it is to creating Aphrodite from the foam of the
sea.‖53 This pre-Feist fog can obscure the idea that once ―originality‖
also demands creativity the courts can (if appropriate) construe statutory
originality to require more creativity,54 even as the constitutionally
necessary creativity minimum remains ―extremely low.‖55
Perhaps, in addition, well-justified alarm at the prospect of a
judicially imposed aesthetic orthodoxy—which Justice Holmes
deployed to such powerful effect in the Bleistein v. Donaldson
49 In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), the
Supreme Court pruned off the line of circuit court cases holding that the Constitution‘s originality
requirement contained no creativity component: ―Original, as the term is used in copyright, means
only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other
works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.‖ Id. at 345 (emphasis
added).
50 See, e.g., Situation Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. ASP Consulting LLC, 560 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir.
2009) (―The originality requirement for copyright is not particularly rigorous.‖); Assessment
Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (―Copyright
law unlike patent law does not require substantial originality.‖); Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc.,
225 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2000) (―The essence of copyrightability is originality of artistic,
creative expression. Given the low threshold for originality under the Copyright Act, as well as
the longstanding and consistent body of case law holding that photographs generally satisfy this
minimal standard, we conclude that Ets-Hokin‘s product shots of the Skyy vodka bottle are
original works of authorship entitled to copyright protection.‖); CCC Info. Servs. v. Maclean
Hunter Mkt. Reports, 44 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir. 1994) (Leval, J.) (―The thrust of the Supreme
Court‘s ruling in Feist was not to erect a high barrier of originality requirement. It was rather to
specify, rejecting the strain of lower court rulings that sought to base protection on the ‗sweat of
the brow,‘ that some originality is essential to protection of authorship, and that the protection
afforded extends only to those original elements.‖).
51 See, e.g., 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.2.1, at 62
(1989) (―For purposes of copyright protection, a work is original if, and to the extent that, it has
not been copied from another source.‖); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965,
1000 (1990) (―Copyright‘s threshold requirement of originality is quite modest. It requires
neither newness nor creativity, but merely creation without any copying.‖).
52 Litman, supra note 51, at 975, 1000-12.
53 Id. at 966.
54 Cf. 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 2:8, at 2-15 (2008) (―Critical elements
of the statute are of the delegating type. These include the meaning of . . . ‗original work of
authorship‘ [in 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)].‖).
55 Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991); see also id. (―[E]ven
a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they
possess some creative spark, ‗no matter how crude, humble or obvious‘ it might be.‖).
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Litographing Co. circus poster case56—deters us from exploring
whether we should demand more creativity as a condition for copyright
protection. It makes little sense to consider demanding more creativity
when we shouldn‘t be measuring it, or comparing one work‘s creativity
to another‘s, at all. The judiciary‘s flight from aesthetic line-drawing
endures,57 and some would chase out all reference to creativity as a
needless temptation to subjectivism.58
But why assume that the only alternative to a minimalist creativity
inquiry is a stifling aesthetic orthodoxy? Especially given that patent
law‘s creativity threshold—nonobviousness59—is framed as the degree
of departure from orthodoxy, i.e., what would have been obvious to the
person having ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time the invention
was made?60 If we approach creativity not as ―the degree to which this
work shows good (i.e., my) taste,‖ but rather as ―the degree to which
this work moves away from conventional expression for this genre at
the time the author authors it,‖ a demand for more creativity would
undermine aesthetic orthodoxy, not support it.
Whatever the reason for it, the apparent neglect of elevating the
minimum originality statutorily required as a means to stem the
copyright flood ends with this Article. I do not suggest that the
literature lacks for robust discussions of copyright‘s originality
requirement, including its creativity component; there are many,61 and
56 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903). Professor
Gorman called Holmes‘ aesthetic nondiscrimination principle in Bleistein ―[o]ne of the more
enduring observations in all of copyright.‖ Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Courts and Aesthetic
Judgments: Abuse or Necessity?, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 1 (2001).
57 See Situation Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. ASP Consulting LLC, 560 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2009)
(―[A] work‘s entitlement to copyright protection does not depend in any way upon the court‘s
subjective assessment of its creative worth.‖); Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d
923, 929 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (―That undemanding [originality] requirement is satisfied in
this case; any more demanding requirement would be burdensome to enforce and would involve
judges in making aesthetic judgments, which few judges are competent to make.‖); Esquire, Inc.
v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (―Neither the Constitution nor the Copyright Act
authorizes the Copyright Office or the federal judiciary to serve as arbiters of national taste.
These officials have no particular competence to assess the merits of one genre of art relative to
another. And to allow them to assume such authority would be to risk stultifying the creativity
and originality the copyright laws were expressly designed to encourage.‖).
58 See Russ VerSteeg, Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law, in 1 INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 1, 20
(Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) (―Preferably, the federal judiciary will completely drop the term
‗creativity‘ from its copyright vocabulary and replace it with an alternative term such as ‗material
variation‘ . . . . This interpretation is essential to avoid the uncertainty and chaos that will
continue if federal judges persist in inventing their own vague, subjective, and amorphous
definitions of ‗creativity.‘‖).
59 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
60 See generally KSR Int‘l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (invalidating an
adjustable gas pedal patent on the ground that the claimed invention would have been obvious).
61 See, e.g., Howard B. Abrams, Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law, 55 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1992); Robert Brauneis, The Transformation of Originality in the
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each has taught me a great deal. What existing commentary has yet to
explore, and what I explore here, is the way we can draw on patent
law‘s nonobviousness requirement—with its focus on departure from
conventional wisdom as the mark of a protectable invention—to
dissolve the sterile dichotomy between near-total abdication and
orthodox aesthetics that Holmes posed in Bleistein.62 Specifically, we
can focus copyright protection on encouraging those who experiment
Progressive-Era Debate over Copyright in News (George Washington Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law
& Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 463, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1365366;
Alan L. Durham, The Random Muse: Authorship and Indeterminacy, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV.
569 (2002); Gorman, supra note 56; Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rationalizing the Allocative/Distributive
Relationship in Copyright, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 853 (2004); Paul J. Heald, Reviving the Rhetoric
of the Public Interest: Choir Directors, Copy Machines, and New Arrangements of Public
Domain Music, 46 DUKE L.J. 241 (1996) [hereinafter Heald, Reviving the Rhetoric]; Paul J.
Heald, The Vices of Originality, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 143 [hereinafter Heald, Vices]; Justin
Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81 (1998); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of
“Authorship,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 455; Dane E. Johnson, Statute of Anne-imals: Should Copyright
Protect Sentient Nonhuman Creators?, 15 ANIMAL L. 15, 29-34 (2008); Roberta Rosenthal
Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1945, 1998-2002 (2006) [hereinafter Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation]; Roberta
Rosenthal Kwall, Originality in Context, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 871 (2007) [hereinafter Kwall,
Originality in Context]; Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683
(2003); Michael D. Murray, Copyright, Originality, and the End of the Scènes à Faire and
Merger Doctrines for Visual Works, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 779 (2006); Nimmer, supra note 35;
Dale P. Olson, Copyright Originality, 48 MO. L. REV. 29 (1983); Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex
Stein, Originality, 95 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2009); Pamela Samuelson, The Originality
Standard for Literary Works Under U.S. Copyright Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 393 (1994);
David E. Shipley, Thin But Not Anorexic: Copyright Protection for Compilations and Other Fact
Works, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 91 (2007); Russ VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, 34 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 801 (1993); Mary Campbell Wojcik, The Antithesis of Originality: Bridgeman,
Image Licensors, and the Public Domain, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 257 (2008); Alfred
C. Yen, The Legacy of Feist: Consequences of the Weak Connection Between Copyright and the
Economics of Public Goods, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1343 (1991); Zimmerman, supra note 1.
62 Littrell argues that the courts should impose a higher originality standard. Ryan Littrell,
Note, Toward a Stricter Originality Standard for Copyright Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 193 (2001).
The only affirmative statement he offers for how to raise the originality standard is as follows:
―Judges, then, should employ aesthetic pragmatism in originality cases.‖ Id. at 225. Moreover,
the piece does not analogize copyright‘s originality to patent‘s nonobviousness.
In a pre-Feist piece, Professor Wiley does analogize originality to nonobviousness, and in a
provocative way. John Shepard Wiley Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REV.
119 (1991). Though I agree with Wiley that exploring the comparison has great value, I differ
with him on key particulars. First, he urges that trial testimony about originality focus on the
question of the adequacy of the incentive to create with, or without, copyright. Id. at 148-49.
This is sensible, he contends, because the core question is one of incentives: ―Copyright courts,
then, should define as original any work whose creation requires enough effort to deter the
creative act absent the copyright‘s exclusive promise.‖ Id. at 148. Second, he argues that the
accused infringer, not the copyright plaintiff, should bear the burden of proof on the question of
originality, id. at 151, and, relatedly, that ―[c]ourts should be modest . . . about their ability to
second-guess an author‘s willingness to create without the promise of copyright,‖ id. at 150. I
cannot square his conclusions with the Supreme Court‘s decision in Feist: Feist both expressly
condemns an effort-focused approach to originality and puts the burden to prove originality on
the infringing plaintiff. Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 353-54, 361
(1991).

JOE.MILLER.31-2

464

1/5/2010 10:48 AM

C A R D OZ O LA W R E V I E W

[Vol. 31:2

with expression to push against, and even break past, the norms and
conventions of routine expression that dominate a given genre at a given
time. Such a focus for copyright makes sense within our utilitarian
framework, given that unorthodox creative expression has greater need
of protection against purely imitative copying: when it sparks a strong
positive response from the public, unconventional expression makes a
highly salient, attractive target for predatory imitation. We also receive
a greater benefit from inducing investment in unconventional
expression: Such expression does more to advance knowledge and
learning than does pedestrian, convention-bound expression.
It is a good time for copyright to take inspiration from patent‘s
nonobviousness doctrine. Just two years ago, in KSR International Co.
v. Teleflex, Inc.,63 the Supreme Court fundamentally reexamined the
workings of the nonobviousness inquiry for the first time since 1976.64
Exploring KSR alongside Feist proves fruitful. First, I consider the
basic justification for hoisting originality to a more demanding level.
The dynamic is straightforward: The stronger the exclusion right, the
harder it should be to obtain. Copyright has grown stronger, and should
be harder to obtain. Second, I recount key judicial events in the history
of copyright‘s demand for creativity as a condition of protection,
including its sharp downturn in Bleistein, Bleistein‘s nadir in Alfred Bell
& Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.,65 and creativity‘s revival in Feist.
Third, I turn to two key judicial events in the history of patent law‘s
demand for creativity as a condition of protection: the creation of the
nonobviousness requirement in 1851 (and its striking similarity to
copyright doctrine of the day), and the requirement‘s renewal in KSR.
Finally, I consider how a patent-inspired approach to copyright‘s
creativity requirement—one focused on the degree to which the work in
question departs from the prevailing conventions of its form—allows
one to demand more creativity without ushering in a stifling orthodoxy.
This approach also provides a common theoretical ground for seemingly
disparate exclusions from copyright coverage, such as scènes à faire;
conventional musical arrangements; modestly varied derivative works;
and works in which, to paraphrase the Matthew Bender & Co. v. West
Publishing Co. court reports case,66 faithful depiction of an item
external to the work is the work‘s central expressive value.67

63
64

550 U.S. 398 (2007).
In the October 1975 Term, the Court decided two nonobviousness cases: Dann v. Johnston,
425 U.S. 219 (1976), and Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976).
65 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
66 158 F.3d 674, 688 (2d Cir. 1998).
67 See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1264-68 (10th
Cir. 2008).
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Stronger Exclusion Rights Need Higher Thresholds

Both originality (in copyright) and nonobviousness (in patent) are
creativity thresholds. Each serves the same basic function, from the
perspective of designing an innovation incentive system based on
awarding exclusion rights. By deciding how to award exclusion rights,
we (a) establish the outcomes we prefer, and (b) avoid the
categorization errors we disfavor, while also (c) preserving a reservoir
of raw materials on which additional creative projects can draw. The
creativity threshold is a key lever for focusing rewards on preferred
outcomes and avoiding the more socially costly categorization error.
We can see the creativity lever‘s role most easily when we
consider the gap that may exist in answering the companion questions:
Is, in truth, an exclusion right needed to get creation here?; and, Is an
exclusion right awarded here? Creating a two-way table that links these
questions, we see there are two hits (true positives and negatives) and
two misses (false positives and negatives). Common sense suggests we
should award exclusion rights using standards that achieve an
acceptable ratio of hits to misses.

Which error is worse?

Is an exclusion
right awarded?

Is an exclusion right
needed to get creation?
YES

NO

YES

True positive

False positive

NO

False negative

True negative

The balance of errors matters, too. (Hence the question posed in
my table‘s upper left corner.) If false negatives are more socially costly
than false positives, for example, we should grant exclusion rights
relatively freely. What the table doesn‘t tell us, of course, is which
error is more socially costly—false negatives (denying an exclusion
right where it is actually needed to incent creation) or false positives
(granting an exclusion right where it is not actually needed to incent
creation)—in a given set of conditions. For example, patent law‘s
strong-exclusion right, which does not require proof of copying (or even
awareness of the patent), could function as a counterproductive tax on
those who solve practical problems by conventional means without
having learned anything from a would-be claimant‘s invention. What
prevents that from happening is a high creativity threshold for patent
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law that denies an exclusion right where the claimed invention reflects
merely the conventional, predictable means for solving a problem.68
The more costly error in a given regime can, moreover, flip over
time. Copyright‘s recent conquest of daily life, rooted in both legal and
technological change, when combined with widespread access to lowcost means for producing and globally disseminating creative works,
makes the social cost of wrongful grants significantly higher than it was
even thirty years ago.69 That change invites the question: Should we
raise the statutory originality standard higher, above the ―extremely
low‖ creativity minimum that Feist requires?
Assume, for the moment, we can find a way to determine whether
a work embodies more than a bare modicum of creativity without
converting copyright into an elite taste code. Is it advisable to do so, as
a matter of fitting means to ends? It seems quite plausible to think so.
In the Anglo-American tradition‘s utilitarian approach to these matters,
intellectual property rights-to-exclude reduce access today in the hope
of more products of the mind tomorrow. In addition, because
tomorrow‘s creations are built, in part, from today‘s and yesterday‘s
creations, perfect exclusion would block too much of the work of others
and thus be self-defeating. (Put another way, behind the veil of
ignorance about whether we will be net creators or net consumers of
products of the mind, we would choose less-than-perfect control.) A
key sign that we embrace less-than-perfect control is the settled idea
that society generally should demand more pronounced creative acts in
exchange for stronger exclusion rights (or, contrariwise, demand less
pronounced creative acts in exchange for weaker exclusion rights).
Copyright has moved toward the stronger-rights pole, as it becomes
technologically easier both to generate copyrighted material and to
(unconsciously) ―copy‖ it. An upward adjustment in originality‘s
demand seems due.
Many have noted the strength/justification link.
Professor
Goldstein, from his vantage point in 1989—pre-Feist, pre-web, preubiquitous-laptops, and pre-high-speed-connectivity—expressly linked
copyright‘s lower originality standard (defined merely as the absence of
copying) to copyright‘s less powerful exclusion rights. According to
Goldstein:
One purpose of copyright is to encourage the production of the
widest possible variety of literary, musical and artistic expression.
The originality requirement helps to achieve this purpose by
allowing protection for works that differ only minimally from earlier
68 See Joseph Scott Miller, Nonobviousness: Looking Back and Looking Ahead, in 2
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL
AGE, supra note 58, at 1, 2-3.
69 See supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
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works. Copyright law‘s originality standard is thus far less exacting
than patent law‘s counterpart standards of novelty and
nonobviousness . . . . The aim of copyright law is to direct
investment toward the production of abundant information, while the
aim of patent law is to direct investment toward the production of
efficient information. The relatively lax originality standard aims at
the first object, while patent law‘s novelty and nonobviousness
requirements aim at the second.70

Similarly, Professor Olson, from a still-earlier vantage point in
1983, called out the same relationship between lower creativity
threshold and lesser exclusion power:
Copyright is a severely limited form of protection. This is not to
say that a copyright cannot be valuable, but what is protected by
copyright is sufficiently narrow that in assessing the originality
standards to be applied in determining whether copyright should be
granted it is important not to lose sight of the nature of copyright
protection. The limited nature of copyright protection also requires
an emphatic rejection of any comparison with patents, either in the
standards to be applied in protecting works in which copyright is
claimed or in identifying the parameters of copyright protection.71

Today—more than twenty-five years later—copyright is no longer
the ―narrow‖ exclusion right Olson described. Comparison to patent
law‘s nonobviousness standard no longer seems out of place.
Patent law commentary makes the same strength/justification link.
In his illuminating study of the nonobviousness doctrine‘s history,
Professor Duffy examines the exclusion/threshold relationship at some
length. Patent law forbids reproducing the claimed invention without
regard to independent creation (or not); and it protects the claimed
practical idea across differing embodiments of that idea, not merely a
particular expression of the idea. The relative power of this exclusion
right highlights the need to take special pains to reserve it for instances
where the advance it protects would not have happened but for the
promised right to exclude, i.e., to avoid wrongful grants more avidly
than wrongful denials. As Duffy explains:
The differences in scope of patents and copyrights have long
been thought to justify requiring very different levels of creativity to
obtain the rights. Because patents preclude more than just copying,
patent law has always required novelty as a substantial element of
the creative standard that must be met. . . . The broader scope of
patent rights may also seem to provide an easy justification for the
nonobviousness doctrine. The intuition is that compared to
copyrights, patent rights place much greater restrictions on the
freedom of others, and thus, more is demanded from the inventor
70
71

1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 51, § 2.2.1, at 63-64.
Olson, supra note 61, at 34.
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than from the author. With greater rights come more stringent
requirements for obtaining the rights. This justification suggests that
if patent law granted narrower rights and allowed independent
creation as a defense, the standard of creativity could sensibly be set
lower.72

In our own time, it is copyright that has grown stronger over time, not
patent law that has grown weaker.
I concede that, in theory, copyright prohibits only the copying of a
protected work, not the independent creation of the same or a similar
work. But the unconscious copying doctrine, combined with
widespread access to pervasive, networked content has hollowed out the
independent creation defense.73 The ease with which we can generate
conventional expression only compounds the exclusion power of readily
proved access and the theory of unconscious copying. Nor is it much of
an answer to say that the high cost of litigation keeps the worst
erroneous (or predatory) infringement claims at bay. Expression
deterred by (perhaps unfounded) worry over wrongful claims, and
saber-rattling letters from lawyers, fly under the radar.
Doctrinal and technological changes thus point toward a higher
creativity threshold for copyright. Assuming we can both hoist
originality and avoid a deadening aesthetics code, we should use partydriven, case-based elaboration of the statutory originality standard to
nudge copyright law in patent law‘s direction. Indeed, courts have
adjusted originality once before—in the early 1900s—when adapting
the standard to changing news distribution technologies.74 To be clear, I
do not think that copyright‘s originality should demand as robust a
creativity showing as patent‘s nonobviousness. Patent law‘s focus on
practical problem-solving under physical constraints that all actors face
in common, and the patent racing and opportunism that this focus
engenders, justify quite a high creativity threshold as to useful
inventions.75 Copyright law can, however, demand more creativity—
keeping the originality standard responsive to legal and technological
changes over the past thirty years—and still impose a requirement more
modest than patent law‘s.

72 John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1,
9-10 (2007).
73 See Bartow, supra note 38, at 83-84.
74 See Brauneis, supra note 61, at 23-32.
75 See Duffy, supra note 72, at 12-16.
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Copyright’s Creativity Demand

The road to the Supreme Court‘s 1991 decision in Feist is long.
With hundreds of originality cases on which to ground discussion, any
selected history rightly provokes at least a little skepticism. Many cases
and commentaries, however, reflect that the cases I discuss here are the
landmarks along the road to Feist.
1.

Early Rumblings

The Supreme Court did not decide a case that turned squarely on
copyright‘s creativity threshold until 1884 (in the Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co v. Sarony case),76 almost a century after Congress
enacted our first copyright statute.77 The lower courts, however, heard
copyright cases turning on what we now know as the originality
requirement. Two decisions from that era are noteworthy here.
The first of these is Emerson v. Davies.78 Justice Story, riding
circuit, judged Charles Davies‘ arithmetic book to infringe Frederick
Emerson‘s copyright in his own arithmetic book.79 Justice Story turned
first to the question whether Emerson‘s ―book contain[ed] any thing
new and original, entitling him to a copy-right.‖80 Justice Story
concluded that Emerson‘s book was original, for copyright purposes,
because it was clear that Emerson had not wholly copied his work from
a pre-existing arithmetic book:
He, in short, who by his own skill, judgment and labor, writes a new
work, and does not merely copy that of another, is entitled to a copyright therein; if the variations are not merely formal and shadowy,
from existing works. He, who constructs by a new plan, and
arrangement, and combination of old materials, in a book designed
for instruction, either of the young, or the old, has a title to a copyright, which cannot be displaced by showing that some part of his
plan, or arrangement or combination, has been used before.81

Justice Story thus stressed the presence of the copyright owner‘s
independent labor, and the absence of copying from another, in
upholding Emerson‘s claim. He relied on independent labor, he
explained, because every expressive work owes a debt of influence, and

76
77
78
79
80
81

Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
8 F. Cas. 615 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436) (Story, J.).
Id. at 625.
Id. at 618.
Id. at 619.
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has some resulting similarity, to other expressive works. According to
Justice Story:
[I]n literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any,
things, which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original
throughout. Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and
must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known and
used before. . . . No man writes exclusively from his own thoughts,
unaided and uninstructed by the thoughts of others. The thoughts of
every man are, more or less, a combination of what other men have
thought and expressed, although they may be modified, exalted, or
improved by his own genius or reflection. If no book could be the
subject of copy-right which was not new and original in the elements
of which it is composed, there could be no ground for any copy-right
in modern times, and we should be obliged to ascend very high, even
in antiquity, to find a work entitled to such eminence.82

Copyright could not succeed widely if it required the utterly-andwholly-new, for such expression only rarely occurs. As Professor
Zimmerman put it, ―[w]hat Story seemed to mean by originality was
something quite simple and straightforward: an original work could not
be copied and must be created by relying on one‘s own labor, skill and
financial resources.‖83 The absence of copying that Justice Story
stressed remains one of originality‘s two core components.84
The second case of note here, decided five years after Emerson, is
Jollie v. Jacque.85 Justice Nelson, riding circuit, denied an injunction
on a musical composition copyright. Loder, the composition‘s author,
began with a musical work published in Germany and ―expended much
labor, time, and musical knowledge and skill, in preparing and
producing‖ a much-improved work for use in a musical theater
production.86 The Jacques denied infringing Loder‘s rights, insisting
that ―the only similarity‖ between their work and Loder‘s ―consist[ed]
in the melody, which, in both publications, was taken from a German
composition, called ‗The Roschen Polka,‘ which was well known and
had been played by various bands in the city.‖87 An expert witness,
noting that Loder‘s work had been arranged for the piano and Roschen
Polka was arranged for the clarinet, opined ―that the adaptation to one
instrument of the music composed for another, requires but an inferior

82
83
84

Id. at 619.
Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 200.
See Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (―Original, as the
term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author (as
opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of
creativity.‖).
85 13 F. Cas. 910 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7437) (Nelson, J.).
86 Id. at 913.
87 Id.
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degree of skill, and can be readily accomplished by any person practised
in the transfer of music.‖88
Justice Nelson concluded that he could not determine the
copyrightability of Loder‘s arrangement on the papers, and so set the
matter over for trial. First, he contrasted the copyrightable creativity
that a new melody embodies from the lesser creativity embodied in ―the
adaptation of it, either by changing it to a dance, or by transferring it
from one instrument to another‖: ―[T]he original air [i.e., melody]
requires genius for its construction; but a mere mechanic in music, it is
said, can make the adaptation or accompaniment.‖89 Next, building on
the distinction between ―genius‖ and the work of ―a mere mechanic,‖
Justice Nelson framed the originality question in the case this way:
The musical composition contemplated by the statute must,
doubtless, be substantially a new and original work; and not a copy
of a piece already produced, with additions and variations, which a
writer of music with experience and skill might readily make. Any
other construction of the act would fail to afford the protection
intended to the original piece from which the [melody] is
appropriated.90

Although he lacked the expertise to determine whether Loder‘s
arrangement was the work of ―a mere mechanic in music‖ and thus
unprotectable—―[p]ersons of skill and experience in the art must be
called in to assist in the determination of th[at] question‖91—Justice
Nelson plainly did not think Loder‘s independent labor was enough, by
itself, to earn copyright protection. Sufficient creativity, surpassing that
of a mere mechanic, was also required.
A year after Jollie, Justice Nelson wrote another opinion that is
central to my comparison of copyright to patent. I take up that patent
law decision, Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,92 below. Suffice it to say, for
the moment, that Justice Nelson described patent law‘s creativity
threshold in the same terms he used in Jollie.93 The contemporary taboo
against comparing originality to nonobviousness is just that—
contemporary.
88
89
90
91
92
93

Id.
Id.
Id. at 913-14 (emphasis added).
Id.
52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).
I learned of Justice Nelson‘s decision in Jollie, and its similarity to Hotchkiss, at a talk
Professors Brauneis and Duffy gave at DePaul Law School on August 10, 2007. See Audio and
video podcasts: Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, held by the Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law, the DePaul University Center for Intellectual Property Law & Information
Technology, the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology, and the Stanford Program in Law,
Science & Technology (Aug. 9-10, 2007), available at http://www.law.depaul.edu/centers
%5Finstitutes/ciplit/ipsc/schedule.asp. Their talk, entitled ―The Curious Divergence of Patent
and Copyright Law,‖ inspired this project. I thank them for it.
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A High Bar

The Emerson and Jollie cases give us two strands for originality:
independent effort (not mere copying), and an adequate amount of
creativity. Two other cases from the 1800s—this time, Supreme Court
cases—considered the kind of creative expression a work must embody
to merit copyright protection. The first, like Jollie, suggests that patent
and copyright require a similar type, if not the same amount, of
creativity. The second involved a work that the Court put well above
the minimum required level of creativity for copyright. Justice Miller
wrote both unanimous opinions.
In The Trade-Mark Cases,94 the Court overturned three convictions
under the then-current federal trademark statute, concluding that
Congress had overstepped its powers under the Progress Clause95 and
the Commerce Clause.96 The case did not turn on copyright validity.
The Court did, however, differentiate protectible trademark use from the
achievements rewarded by patent and copyright. Establishing a valid
mark, the Court observed, ―requires no fancy or imagination, no genius,
no laborious thought. It is simply founded on priority of appropriation,‖
by use in commerce.97 The trademark system‘s frequent reliance on
long-known words as marks is quite different from the patent system‘s
demand for an inventive product or process:
The ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention or
discovery. The trade-mark recognized by the common law is
generally the growth of a considerable period of use, rather than a
94
95

100 U.S. 82 (1879).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Congress ―[t]o promote the progress of science
and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries‖). Naming this clause presents a bit of a value choice. Some
call it the Copyright & Patent Clause, although neither of these terms appears in it. Others call it
the Intellectual Property Clause, although, again, the phrase does not appear there, and the word
―property,‖ which is used elsewhere in the Constitution (but not here), is rich with connotations.
Still others call it the Exclusive Rights Clause, which at least has the virtue of textual connection;
but that name focuses on the means Congress is empowered to use, rather than on the end it is
empowered to pursue. I prefer to call it the Progress Clause.
96 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (empowering Congress ―[t]o regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes‖).
97 The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94. In the same vein, the Court noted that ―[t]he trademark may be, and generally is, the adoption of something already in existence as the distinctive
symbol of the party using it.‖ Id. This remains true today. One type of mark—a fanciful mark—
is a word fabricated especially for use as a mark, such as Kodak or Exxon. Coining such a mark
takes some creativity, to be sure. But marks comprising well-known words or symbols are also
valid, so long as they are capable of distinguishing the mark owner‘s good or service from the
offerings of others. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining ―trademark‖). ―Apple‖ for computers (an
arbitrary mark), ―Tide‖ for detergent (a suggestive mark), and ―Coca-Cola‖ for soft drinks (a
descriptive mark), all comprise words that existed long before the development of the products
for which they serve as trademarks.
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sudden invention. It is often the result of accident rather than design,
and when under the act of Congress it is sought to establish it by
registration, neither originality, invention, discovery, science, nor art
is in any way essential to the right conferred by that act.98

Note that the Court both denied that ―invention‖ is a necessary
feature of a valid mark, and used the word ―originality‖—which we
now associate so strongly with copyright—on a par with ―invention,‖
the more patent-related term to the modern ear. The Court then found
that trademark is as distant from copyright as it is from patent:
If we should endeavor to classify it under the head of writings of
authors, the objections are equally strong. In this, as in regard to
inventions, originality is required. And while the word writings may
be liberally construed, as it has been, to include original designs for
engravings, prints, [etc.], it is only such as are original, and are
founded in the creative powers of the mind. The writings which are
to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the
form of books, prints, engravings and the like.99

Once again, the Court used ―originality‖ to denote creativity, in both
copyright and patent. A century later, in Feist, the Court expressly
relied on this portion of The Trade-Mark Cases to explain its conclusion
that ―originality requires independent creation plus a modicum of
creativity.‖100
Five years after The Trade-Mark Cases, in Burrow-Giles
Lithographing Co. v. Sarony,101 the Court upheld the copyrightability of
a posed portrait photograph. Napoleon Sarony, the famed portrait
photographer,102 had taken a series of photographs of Oscar Wilde.103
In Sarony‘s infringement suit, the central issue was whether Congress
had exceeded its Progress Clause power in extending copyright
protection to photographs.104 The Court considered the expansion of
federal copyright protection from its humbler beginnings in 1790
(covering maps, charts, and books) to its then-current embrace of
photographs, dramatic or musical compositions, engravings, paintings,
statues, and more.105 The Court construed the key constitutional term,
―writings,‖ to mean ―literary productions . . . includ[ing] all forms of
98
99
100
101
102

The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94.
Id. (emphases added).
Feist Publ‘ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (emphasis added).
111 U.S. 53 (1884).
―By 1864, [Sarony] had established his studio in New York City, where he made a fortune
taking portraits of the leading actors and literary figures of the period.‖ WAYNE CRAVEN,
AMERICAN ART: HISTORY AND CULTURE 373 (2003).
103 The photos are at Sarony Photographs of Wilde, http://www.humnet.ucla.edu/
humnet/clarklib/wildphot/sarony.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2009). The photo at issue in BurrowGiles, Sarony‘s Wilde #18, is the sixth image on this web page.
104 Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 56.
105 Id. at 56-57.
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writing, printing, engraving, etching, [etc.], by which the ideas in the
mind of the author are given visible expression.‖106 Photographs plainly
met this standard, at least ―so far as they are representatives of original
intellectual conceptions of the author.‖107 And Sarony‘s photograph of
Wilde, the Court concluded, was ―an original work of art, the product of
[Sarony‘s] intellectual invention.‖108 Specifically,
[t]he third finding of facts says, in regard to the photograph in
question, that it is a ―useful, new, harmonious, characteristic, and
graceful picture, and that plaintiff made the same . . . entirely from
his own original mental conception, to which he gave visible form by
posing the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and
arranging the costume, draperies, and other various accessories in
said photograph, arranging the subject so as to present graceful
outlines, arranging and disposing the light and shade, suggesting and
evoking the desired expression, and from such disposition,
arrangement, or representation, made entirely by plaintiff, he
produced the picture in suit.‖109

In other words, ―[t]he photograph by Sarony was one in which the
author did not merely reproduce reality mechanically, but one where he
manipulated it to achieve a desired effect.‖110 Given Sarony‘s creative
and graceful work, copyright attached.
Two things emerge from this brief survey. First, patent and
copyright were not sharply disparate regimes with wholly separate
vocabularies. Both required creativity as a condition for protection, and
words we now think of as contrasting terms of art—originality and
invention—served equally well for one another in the Court‘s cases.
Second, as Professor Zimmerman concluded from her survey of these
and other cases, ―they might well have suggested that, at the close of the
nineteenth century, copyright was intended to promote socially valuable

106
107

Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
Id. The Court expressly reserved judgment on the question whether copyright could
protect what it called ―the ordinary production of a photograph,‖ i.e., ―the manual operation . . . of
transferring to the [photographic] plate the visible representation of some existing object, the
accuracy of this representation being its highest merit.‖ Id. at 59. As Professor Heald notes,
Sarony ―therefore provided no minimum baseline for its requirement of ‗original intellectual
conception‘ and clearly passed on the opportunity to declare purely mimetic works of image
reproduction unoriginal and uncopyrightable.‖ Heald, Vices, supra note 61, at 148. More
recently, a district court did hold such an art reproduction photograph unoriginal. See Bridgeman
Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Wojcik, supra note 61.
108 Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 60.
The opinion equates ―originalty‖ and ―invention‖
throughout this analysis, id. at 59-60, showing none of the modern fussiness at separating
copyright from patent terminology as it repeatedly uses both words to refer interchangeably to
copyright and patent requirements.
109 Id. at 60.
110 Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 201.
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kinds of work that also exhibited some fairly high level of human
imagination or intellectual input.‖111 Then came Justice Holmes.
3.

Abandoning Creativity Review

In Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,112 the Court once
again confronted the question whether copyright protected particular
works—in this case, color posters used to advertise a circus.113 The
Sixth Circuit had denied copyright protection to the posters, extending a
Supreme Court decision denying copyright protection to an ink bottle
label114 to preclude copyright protection for posters that ―ha[ve] no
other use than that of a mere advertisement, and no value aside from
this function.‖115 The Supreme Court, Justice Holmes writing for seven,
reversed.
There can be little doubt after looking at the fanciful, florid circus
posters from this era that the posters in Bleistein readily met the
creativity standard the Court expressed in Sarony.116 The posters are no
less graceful and creative, in their own way, than Sarony‘s photo of
Wilde. Justice Holmes, however, sought to change the Sarony standard,
rather than to apply it. Indeed, Bleistein‘s ―exceedingly low standard‖
of creativity ―was the end of any effort to impose a meaningful
threshold requirement for originality,‖ 117 until the Supreme Court
renewed the effort in Feist.
Justice Holmes made short work of the Sixth Circuit‘s reasoning:
―A picture is none the less a picture and none the less a subject of
copyright that it is used for an advertisement.‖118 More important, he
reoriented the originality inquiry from a work-centered creativity

111
112
113

Id.
188 U.S. 239 (1902).
At Princeton Univ. Library, Circus Posters, http://libweb5.princeton.edu/visual_materials/
Circus/TC093.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2009), you can see images of color circus posters from
the late 1800s and early 1900s. Sadly, the site does not have images of Wallace Show posters.
However, a search for ―Great Wallace Shows‖ on Google‘s image search page will usually turn
up images of the sorts of posters at issue in the Supreme Court case.
114 Higgins v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428, 431 (1891).
115 104 F. 993, 996 (6th Cir. 1900).
116 See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT‘S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 49 (Stanford Univ. Press 2003) (1994) (―The creativity criterion that the Supreme Court
had adopted in the Oscar Wilde case offered a tempting dividing line between copyrightable and
uncopyrightable subject matter, and would certainly have sustained copyright in the elaborate
circus posters.‖).
117 Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 203-04.
118 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1902). Judge Learned Hand
echoed Holmes when, as a trial judge, Hand opined that ―no photograph, however simple, can be
unaffected by the personal influence of the author, and no two will be absolutely alike.‖
Jewelers‘ Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 274 F. 932, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
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assessment (of the type used in Sarony and, before it, in Jollie) to an
author-centered effort assessment (of the type Justice Story had used in
Emerson). Beginning from the premise that multiple artists could each
claim a valid copyright in their respective drawings of the same actual
face,119 he grounded copyright in the individual artist‘s effort:
The copy [i.e., the work] is the personal reaction of an individual
upon nature. Personality always contains something unique. It
expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest
grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man‘s
alone. That something he may copyright unless there is a restriction
in the words of the act.120

The focus is, again, not on ―the quality or quantity of authorial
input,‖121 but on whether the work shows the author‘s ―personal
reaction‖—―something unique,‖ ―something irreducible‖—rather than a
self-concealing imitation of another‘s work. And the merit of protecting
the author‘s effort, in a case such as this, is only underscored by the
accused infringer‘s desire to make unauthorized copies of the work:
―That these pictures had their worth and their success is sufficiently
shown by the desire to reproduce them without regard to the plaintiffs‘
rights.‖122
Why shift away from an external, more demanding measure of
creativity toward an easily-met effort standard? Here Justice Holmes
raised the spectre of stifling judicial aesthetic edicts distorting the
copyright field. The argument reverberates even now, because it is
quite compelling:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At
the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss
appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until
the public had learned the new language in which their author spoke.
It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of
Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection
119
120
121
122

Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249.
Id. at 250.
Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 202.
Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 252. Professor Jaszi, in his analysis of Bleistein, highlights this
connection between a minimalist originality standard and a commodities-based view of
expression:
The Bleistein opinion, with its emphasis on the ―work‖ and its abdication of a
judicial role as aesthetic arbiter, both effaces and generalizes ―authorship,‖ leaving this
category with little or no meaningful content and none of its traditional associations.
In so doing, the opinion rationalizes a significant expansion of copyright protection. In
effect, the revision of ―authorship‖ in Bleistein was instrumental in broadening and
generalizing the category of works that could be considered as copyrightable
commodities.
Jaszi, supra note 61, at 483 (footnote omitted).
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when seen for the first time. At the other end, copyright would be
denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the
judge. Yet if they command the interest of any public, they have a
commercial value—it would be bold to say that they have not an
aesthetic and educational value—and the taste of any public is not to
be treated with contempt.123

The doleful regime Justice Holmes imagines, and then deflects,
rests on an important premise—namely, that judging creativity, beyond
a minimal check for an author‘s ―personal reaction‖ in the work, entails
judging works based on one‘s own aesthetic taste. Some works will be
―repulsive,‖ and they are ―sure to miss appreciation.‖ He describes a
reaction from personal taste. Other works will be thought vulgar,
―appeal[ing] to a public less educated than the judge.‖ Again, he
describes a legal judgment founded on a judicial reaction from taste.
But is the premise accurate? Is taste the only measure of creativity,
if we venture past an inspection for a sign—however minimal—of the
author‘s personality? Our experience with patent law‘s nonobviousness
requirement suggests that taste is not the only measure of creativity.
We can also assess creativity as a departure from that which is
conventional, routine, or pedestrian. Rather than judge a work based
solely on our own taste, we can judge a work by the ways in which the
author‘s individual voice stands apart from conventional expression. In
a way, this alternative dissolves Justice Holmes‘ fear by charging right
at it: don‘t dis Manet because he paints unconventionally, reward him
precisely because he does so. Perhaps one can avoid imposing an
orthodoxy by rewarding what is, for its time and type, unorthodox.
I return to this alternative creativity inquiry after reviewing both
Feist‘s turn away from Bleistein‘s minimalism and key features of the
nonobviousness doctrine. Before discussing Feist, however, it is
instructive to consider the absurd nadir of Bleistein‘s ―personal
reaction‖ inquiry: Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.124
In Alfred Bell, the Second Circuit upheld a copyright infringement
judgment that Alfred Bell & Co. had secured against Catalda Fine Arts.
Alfred Bell had made mezzotint engraving reproductions125 of eight

123 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251. This is known as the aesthetic nondiscrimination principle. See
supra note 56.
124 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951). On Bell‘s absurdity, see Jaszi, supra note 61, at 483: ―The
disassociation of ‗authorship‘ from ‗genius,‘ and its reassociation with the meanest levels of
creative activity, continued apace in copyright cases after Bleistein. Perhaps the most striking
example of this tendency is the noted decision in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.‖
125 To learn about mezzotint engraving, with examples, consult the Metropolitan Museum of
Art‘s ―Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History.‖ Among its many ―Thematic Essays‖ is one called
―The Printed Image in the West: Mezzotint.‖ Elizabeth E. Barker, The Printed Image in the
West: Mezzotint, in METRO. MUSEUM OF ART, HEILBRUNN TIMELINE OF ART HISTORY (2003),
http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/mztn/hd_mztn.htm.
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famous paintings.126 Catalda Fine Arts made lithographs from Alfred
Bell‘s engravings. As the trial court explained, ―[t]he artists employed
to produce these mezzotint engravings in suit attempted faithfully to
reproduce paintings in the mezzotint medium so that the basic idea,
arrangement, and color scheme of each painting are those of the original
artist.‖127 At the same time, however,
[t]he work of the engraver upon the plate requires the individual
conception, judgment and execution by the engraver on the depth
and shape of the depressions in the plate to be made by the scraping
process in order to produce in this other medium the engraver‘s
concept of the effect of the oil painting. No two engravers can
produce identical interpretations of the same oil painting.128

The trial court concluded that the engraver‘s personal interpretation,
varied as it was from that of other engravers and from the underlying
painting, met the Bleistein originality threshold.129 The Second Circuit
agreed.130
Given Bleistein‘s originality standard, and the trial court‘s findings
about the inherent idiosyncrasies of each engraver‘s mezzotint
reproduction, in the copper plate medium, of a painting on canvas, one
is hardly surprised that the Second Circuit upheld the trial court‘s
originality judgment here. What is surprising is the extreme to which
the Second Circuit took Bleistein‘s ―personal reaction‖ theory of
originality. At first, Judge Frank, writing for the court, hewed closely to
Bleistein:
All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the statute is
that the author contributed something more than a merely trivial
variation, something recognizably his own. Originality in this
context means little more than a prohibition of actual copying. No
matter how poor artistically the author‘s addition, it is enough if it be
his own.131

But then the court veered off into the absurd, and to a point that
was not necessary to decide the copyrightability of the mezzotints in
suit. Its leaping-off point was the basic fact that a mezzotint is not a
precise, exacting imitation of a painting:
There is evidence that they were not intended to, and did not, imitate
the paintings they reproduced. But even if their substantial
departures from the paintings were inadvertent, the copyrights would
be valid. A copyist‘s bad eyesight or defective musculature, or a
shock caused by a clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently
126
127
128
129
130
131

74 F. Supp. 973, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 975 & n.3.
191 F.2d 99, 102-05 (2d Cir. 1951).
Id. at 102-03 (internal quotations, footnotes, and citations omitted).
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distinguishable variations. Having hit upon such a variation
unintentionally, the ―author‖ may adopt it as his and copyright it.132

This thunderclap theory of originality sinks below even Bleistein‘s
―personal reaction‖ theory because it severs the link between expression
and volition. And we are far removed, indeed, from the Sarony Court‘s
equation of creativity with an author‘s thoughtful, considered
engagement with the stuff of expression, whereby ―the ideas in the mind
of the author are given visible expression.‖133
In a way, Judge Frank‘s conclusion about Bleistein‘s logical end
point is hard to fault. Having turned the creativity inquiry in on itself by
focusing on the author‘s effort (rather than on the nature of her creative
achievement in the work), how can one reject the conclusion that a
spasm from loud noise is uniquely that author‘s spasm? By adopting
the spasm‘s effect, rather than rejecting it, the author renders it a
copyrightable personal reaction. To one who, like me, thinks
copyright‘s originality standard needs a more, not less, demanding acid
test of creativity, Bell‘s thunderclap theory is a reductio ad absurdum
that condemns Bleistein‘s personality-based approach.
4.

Restoring a Constitutional Creativity Minimum

The Supreme Court did not return to the question of copyright‘s
creativity threshold until 1991, in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.134 Feist holds that a ―white pages‖ book of
residential phone numbers, listed alphabetically by surname, is
uncopyrightable because it falls below the constitutionally mandated
minimum creativity level that copyright requires.135 Feist re-reorients
the creativity inquiry, restoring Sarony‘s focus on the work‘s objective
character (and displacing Bleistein‘s mere search for signs of the
author‘s personal reaction). Feist also, like Jollie, The Trade-Mark
Cases, and Sarony, casts copyright‘s creativity talk in patent-like
language. Because Feist sets a constitutional floor, rather than a
statutory ceiling,136 we have the flexibility to pursue the patent law
comparison on statutory grounds.137
132
133
134
135

Id. at 104-05 (footnotes omitted).
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
499 U.S. 340 (1991).
Id. at 346-47 (discussing the constitutionally mandated nature of the creativity
requirement); id. at 362-64 (holding that Rural‘s listings book falls below the constitutionally
required minimum).
136 It is settled that Feist provides a constitutional, not a statutory, creativity minimum. See,
e.g., Samuelson, supra note 61, at 395 (―Even though there was a perfectly adequate statutory
ground for the decision, the Court—not once, but numerous times—indicated that it believed that
Congress lacks power to amend the copyright statute to provide protection to data compilations
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Justice O‘Connor begins the Court‘s analysis in Feist by
reaffirming that ―[t]he sine qua non of copyright is originality.‖138
Originality, in turn, requires creativity: ―The originality requirement
articulated in The Trade-Mark Cases and [Sarony] remains the
touchstone of copyright protection today.‖ 139 At the same time, the
creativity the Constitution demands is modest: ―To be sure, the requisite
level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.
The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess
some creative spark, ‗no matter how crude, humble or obvious‘ it might
be.‖140 After a thorough critique of the ―sweat of the brow‖ theory of
copyright141—according to which one obtains copyright protection for a
fact compilation by virtue of the labor one put into gathering the facts it
contains142—Justice O‘Connor concludes that a fact compilation‘s
copyright, if it exists at all, rests on whether the author‘s ―selection,
coordination, and arrangement [of the data] are sufficiently original to
merit protection.‖143 Like works generally, many compilation works
will easily clear this constitutional minimum, ―but not all will.‖144
Specifically, ―[t]here remains a narrow category of works in which the
creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually
nonexistent.‖145 Rural‘s alphabetically arranged phone number list falls
into this latter, uncopyrightable category.
What is striking, beyond the Court‘s conclusion that a ―white
pages‖ book is too uncreative to pass constitutional muster, is the
language Justice O‘Connor uses to describe the book‘s lack of

unable to pass a creativity-based originality standard.‖). Most pass over the distinction, but it is
real.
137 The Copyright Act‘s signal requirement—―original works of authorship,‖ 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) (2006) (emphasis added)—leaves ―original‖ undefined. The Act‘s legislative history
pegs the term ―original‖ to then-extant caselaw, at least some of which embraced a creativity
standard. See 2 PATRY, supra note 54, at § 3:26, at 3-75 to -78 (2007) (reviewing the relevant
legislative history); Russ VerSteeg, Sparks in the Tinderbox: Feist, “Creativity,” and the
Legislative History of the 1976 Copyright Act, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 549, 579-85 (1995) (same).
Importantly, ―[t]he Feist Court did not strip Congress of its voice on all originality issues; instead,
the Court only set a threshold standard. Congress is free to set a higher standard, or, in protecting
particular types of works, to declare how the originality requirement must be satisfied.‖ William
Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property: An Imminent Constitutional
Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 377 n.104 (1999). My approach is, in effect, to explore
the flexibility Congress has provided to the courts, for case-by-case development, in the statutory
term ―original.‖
138 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
139 Id. at 347.
140 Id. at 345 (quoting 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT §§ 2.01(A), (B) (1990)).
141 Id. at 351-58, 360-61.
142 Id. at 352.
143 Id. at 358.
144 Id. at 359.
145 Id.
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creativity. As others have noted,146 the Court‘s language rings with
patent-law overtones. Although originality ―does not require that facts
be presented in an innovative or surprising way[,] . . . the selection and
arrangement of facts cannot be so mechanical or routine as to require no
creativity whatsoever.‖147 Patent law, too, contrasts the nonobvious
from the merely routine or mechanical. Rural‘s listing book does not
pass muster, as the Court explains in a passage that repeatedly uses
patent law language:
The selection, coordination, and arrangement of Rural‘s white pages
do not satisfy the minimum constitutional standards for copyright
protection. As mentioned at the outset, Rural‘s white pages are
entirely typical. Persons desiring telephone service in Rural‘s
service area fill out an application and Rural issues them a telephone
number. In preparing its white pages, Rural simply takes the data
provided by its subscribers and lists it alphabetically by surname.
The end product is a garden-variety white pages directory, devoid of
even the slightest trace of creativity.
Rural‘s selection of listings could not be more obvious: It
publishes the most basic information—name, town, and telephone
number—about each person who applies to it for telephone service.
This is ―selection‖ of a sort, but it lacks the modicum of creativity
necessary to transform mere selection into copyrightable expression.
Rural expended sufficient effort to make the white pages directory
useful, but insufficient creativity to make it original.
....
Nor can Rural claim originality in its coordination and
arrangement of facts. The white pages do nothing more than list
Rural‘s subscribers in alphabetical order. This arrangement may,
technically speaking, owe its origin to Rural; no one disputes that
Rural undertook the task of alphabetizing the names itself. But there
is nothing remotely creative about arranging names alphabetically in
a white pages directory. It is an age-old practice, firmly rooted in
tradition and so commonplace that it has come to be expected as a
matter of course. It is not only unoriginal, it is practically inevitable.
This time-honored tradition does not possess the minimal creative
spark required by the Copyright Act and the Constitution.148

The Court‘s analysis is, admittedly, more a negative statement than
an affirmative one, more a description of how Rural fell short than a
description of how much creativity it takes to clear the constitutional
minimum. ―Feist itself does not promulgate a definition or a test for
146 See, e.g., EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 398-400 (2002); Russ VerSteeg & Paul K.
Harrington, Nonobviousness as an Element of Copyrightability? (Or, Is the Jewel in the Lotus a
Cubic Zirconia?), 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 331, 379-81 (1992).
147 499 U.S. at 362.
148 Id. at 362-63 (emphases added and citation omitted).
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determining creativity.‖149 And yet, the Court‘s descriptors paint a
picture: a fatally uncreative expressive work is typical, garden-variety,
obvious, an age-old practice, traditional, commonplace, expected as a
matter of course, practically inevitable. All the same could just as
easily be said of an obvious, and thus unpatentable, invention.
It is to patent law‘s nonobviousness requirement that I now turn.
C.

Patent’s Nonobviousness Demand

Nonobviousness doctrine in the United States has a long, complex
history. I have summarized that history elsewhere,150 and Professor
Duffy explores it at great length in his important Inventing Invention
piece.151 For the current discussion, however, I need only highlight its
Supreme Court endpoints—the first nonobviousness case, and the most
recent (as of this writing).
The modern nonobviousness requirement entered U.S. law with the
Supreme Court‘s unanimous 1851 decision in Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood.152 Its author, Justice Nelson, had rendered the copyright
decision in Jollie v. Jaque the year before.153 The contrast in Jollie,
recall, was between the copyrightable composition that reflects ―genius‖
and the uncopyrightable work of a ―mere mechanic in music.‖154
Justice Nelson drew a strikingly similar contrast in Hotchkiss.
In Hotchkiss, the Court struck down a patent claim to a clay
doorknob on the ground that the new doorknob configuration was too
small an improvement to merit protection.155 The new configuration
included a clay knob around a dovetail-based metal rod; the prior art
included clay knobs with straight rods and metal or wood knobs with
dovetail rods.156 The Court assumed, for purposes of argument, ―that,
by connecting the clay or porcelain knob with the metallic shank in this
well-known [dovetail] mode, an article is produced better and cheaper
than in the case of the metallic or wood knob.‖157 Nevertheless, it held
the new configuration to be unpatentable.

149
150
151
152

Abrams, supra note 61, at 15.
See Miller, supra note 68.
Duffy, supra note 72.
52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851). For an engaging discussion of Hotchkiss and its place in
the history of nonobviousness law, see Edward C. Walterscheid, The Hotchkiss Unobviousness
Standard: Early Judicial Activism in the Patent Law, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 103 (2005).
153 13 F. Cas. 910 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7,437) (Nelson, J.); see supra notes 85-93 and
accompanying text.
154 Jollie, 13 F. Cas. at 913.
155 Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 266-67.
156 Id. at 265.
157 Id. at 266.
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According to Justice Nelson, an invention is not patentable unless
its achievement is marked by ―more ingenuity and skill . . . than were
possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business.‖158
Justice Nelson contrasted ―the work of the skillful mechanic‖ with ―that
of the inventor,‖159 whose more creative response to the problem at
hand surpasses that which any ordinary mechanic would offer when
confronted with the same problem. Save for the problem-solving
setting, Justice Nelson approached the question of patent law‘s requisite
creativity in much the same way he approached copyright law‘s
requisite creativity a year earlier.
Congress first codified this nonobviousness requirement in 1952,
as part of a larger overhaul of our patent statutes.160 The statute
continues the ―functional approach‖ of Hotchkiss, mandating the same
―comparison between the subject matter of the patent, or patent
application, and the background skill of the calling.‖ 161 In 2007, the
Supreme Court—for the first time in more than a generation—
reconsidered the fundamentals of nonobviousness. The Court was
prompted to do so by the long period during which the Federal Circuit
had, in an understandable effort to prevent the nonobviousness inquiry
from falling prey to the distortions of hindsight bias, made
nonobviousness tantamount to ―not directly suggested.‖162 As I have
discussed elsewhere, the flaw in this approach—from the Supreme
Court‘s perspective—is that it assumed away too much of the ordinary
artisan‘s capacity to generate new solutions when confronted with a
problem.163 Some of those new solutions—the obvious ones—are
insufficiently creative to merit patent protection. To equate ―obvious‖
only with ―directly suggested‖ comes close to collapsing the
nonobviousness requirement into a mere supernovelty test (i.e., a

158
159
160

Id. at 267.
Id.
See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12-17 (1966) (describing the codification of
Hotchkiss in 35 U.S.C. § 103).
161 Id. at 12. Specifically, the statute provides as follows:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).
162 In 2001, Professor Vermont described the prevailing approach to patent law‘s creativity
threshold this way: ―[A]ny independent thought overcomes the obviousness bar. If a mediocre
artisan has to do more than read the prior art and myopically follow its suggestions, the invention
is not obvious.‖ Samson Vermont, A New Way to Determine Obviousness: Applying the Pioneer
Doctrine to 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), 29 AIPLA Q.J. 375, 389 n.22 (2001).
163 Joseph Scott Miller, Remixing Obviousness, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 237, 239, 244-50
(2007).
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novelty test applied over multiple pieces of prior art, rather than with a
single prior art reference).164 That is a recipe for avoiding wrongful
denials at the expense of far too many wrongful grants.
In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,165 the Supreme Court
struck down a patent claim directed to the combination of two prior art
technologies—an adjustable gas pedal and a pedal-mounted electronic
sensor to link the pedal to a computer-controlled throttle. Along the
way, the Court emphasized its recognition that inventing solutions, even
unpatentable ones, involves creative ability: ―A person of ordinary skill
is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.‖166 But it
cautioned, too, that ―[g]ranting patent protection to advances that would
occur in the ordinary course without real innovation retards progress,‖
rather than promoting it.167 What, then, separates the nonobvious wheat
from the obvious chaff? In a word, unconventionality. Or, in another,
unpredictability. As Justice Kennedy explains:
 ―The combination of familiar elements according to known
methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than
yield predictable results.‖168
 ―[W]hen a patent claims a structure already known in the
prior art that is altered by the mere substitution of one
element for another known in the field, the combination
must do more than yield a predictable result.‖169
 ―[W]hen the prior art teaches away from combining certain
known elements, discovery of a successful means of
combining them is more likely to be nonobvious.‖170
 ―[A] court must ask whether the improvement is more than
the predictable use of prior art elements according to their
established functions.‖171
When we place KSR‘s teachings alongside Feist‘s, the similarity is
plain. Both indicate that protectable creativity consists not of the
typical, the obvious, the predictable, or the practically inevitable, but
consists rather of the unconventional, the unpredicted, and the
164 See Miller, supra note 68, at 12; John H. Barton, Non-Obviousness, 43 IDEA 475, 496
(2003).
165 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
166 Id. at 421; see also id. at 420 (―[I]n many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit
the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.‖).
167 Id. at 419.
168 Id. at 416.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 417. The examination guidelines the Patent & Trademark Office issued in response
to KSR stress, throughout, the need to reject patent claims on inventions that reflect nothing more
than predictable, conventional solutions to problems. See Examination Guidelines for
Determining Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in View of the Supreme Court Decision in KSR
International v. Teleflex Inc., 72 Fed. Reg. 57,526 (Oct. 10, 2007).
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unorthodox. By extending protection to creations in this wilder terrain,
the patent and copyright regimes offer greater rewards to those who take
greater risks. By demanding more, rather than less, creativity as the
price for exclusive rights, these regimes avoid the costlier error of
wrongful grants (rather than fretting too much over wrongful denials).
And by limiting rights-rewards to the unorthodox, these regimes do not
trap us in a straightjacket of convention—aesthetic or otherwise—but
help free us from such restraints.
D.

Creativity’s Departure from the Conventional

In Feist and KSR, the Supreme Court grappled with, and rejected,
two claims to protection under the intellectual property laws—one
under copyright, the other under patent. In both cases, the Court offered
guidance on the creativity necessary to obtain copyright or patent
protection. There are differences between the systems, to be sure. But I
am struck by the similarity in the Court‘s approach to these two similar
questions about the creativity threshold for protection. As Professor
Heald observes in his provocative exploration of originality in the
context of music composition and arrangement, ―[b]oth the copyright
law originality requirement and the patent law non-obviousness
requirement focus on whether the derivative work is the result of
conventions familiar to creators working in the relevant culture.‖172
Teachers in writing, painting, music, sculpture, photography,
computer science, pottery, journalism, and film classes (and others
besides)173 tutor their students daily in mastering the basic, routine
expressive moves of their chosen medium. Every domain of expression
thus involves a large stock of conventional expressive moves.
Moreover, people respond to situations more uniformly than a typically
personality-centered view of human behavior would suggest.174 This

172 Heald, Reviving the Rhetoric, supra note 61, at 260; see also id. at 262-63 (―[A]fter Feist
the question is . . . were these musicians of ‗reasonable talent‘ guided in writing similar alto lines
by existing musical conventions? A line dictated by accepted rules of composition would not be
original, but if the rules permitted numerous harmonic possibilities or if the new alto part broke
significantly from convention, then it would be original.‖).
173 For example, in working on this project, I happened upon a website that teaches, with
supporting drawings, the ―grammatical and aesthetic traditions‖ for comic book lettering. Nate
Piekos, Comics Grammar & Tradition, BLAMBOT, http://www.blambot.com/grammar.shtml (last
visited Oct. 30, 2009).
174 See SCOTT P LOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 174-88
(1993) (explaining the fundamental attribution error, according to which people tend to
overestimate the power of personality, and underestimate the power of situation, in explaining
human behavior). The most famous examples of the phenomenon at work, within experimental
psychology, are the Milgrim shock-administration experiments and the Zimbardo prison role-
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strong influence of situation on behavior extends to expressive
behavior, as even a few minutes at the web site Photo Clichés amply
demonstrates.175 Stock expressive moves are part of the public domain
in the sense that they need to be kept freely available to support a robust
expressive ecology.176 And, despite how routinely individuals deploy
these expressive moves, many of them surely embody more creativity
than the constitutional minimum set forth in Feist. As a result, our
copyright system—the exclusion rights of which have greatly expanded
both legally and technologically over the past thirty years—threatens to
trigger infringement liability far too readily.
Imagine, then, applying a more demanding statutory originality
requirement for copyright: in this alternate world, copyright protects a
work insofar as the author can show that the work departed from
routine, typical, or conventional expression in the pertinent genre at the
time he or she authored the work. The expression need not be novel in
the patent law sense, i.e., the author need not show that the expression is
unprecedented; the accused infringer thus cannot negate the work‘s
originality merely by showing that someone else produced the same
expressive work at some point in the past (as one can in patent law).
The expression must, however, be demonstrably atypical or
unconventional in some respect, compared to common expression that
dominated the genre when the author authored the work. Only
expression that is original in this sense is copyrightable on this new
view.
Copyright law, like patent law, can establish this higher creativity
threshold primarily through case law development. 177 The statutory
term ―original‖ is not expressly defined, and is thus open to upward
adjustment in light of profoundly changed technological environments,
consistent with the remainder of the Copyright Act‘s text and
purpose.178 Nothing in our copyright treaty obligations prevents U.S.
courts from making the adjustment.179 Accused infringers should thus
playing experiments. See generally PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING
HOW GOOD PEOPLE TURN EVIL (2007).
175 Photo Clichés, http://www.photocliches.com/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
The site
describes its mission this way: ―Collecting pictures of people being uniquely hilarious, just like
all the other people who took the same photo.‖ Id.
176 See generally Litman, supra note 51.
177 See Duffy, supra note 72 (recounting the historical development of nonobviousness law).
The Copyright Office, unlike the Patent Office, does not engage in substantive examination of a
registrant‘s underlying exclusion claim. Given the low expected value of any given copyrightable
work, and the high volume of copyrightable works being produced, it seems that an enforcement
suit, rather than an elaborate administrative review, is the better forum for assessing originality.
Cf. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001).
178 See supra note 137.
179 The Berne Convention does not define the originality or creativity required for copyright,
and certainly does not cap it at a particular level. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 102 Stat. 2853, 1161 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Berne
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use Feist to frame a lack-of-originality defense. Importantly, such a
defense is more likely to prevail where the purported infringer provides
a rich factual record that strongly demonstrates the defense‘s central
premise—the purported copyright owner‘s expression is so utterly
pedestrian, conventional, and obvious for its genre and time that, much
like the white pages, it is fatally unoriginal.180 Courts will often benefit,
no doubt, from expert testimony about routine, conventional expression
embodied in publicly available works181 in the genre at a given time,
and how the purportedly protectable work departs from those
conventions. With the parties‘ help, courts can meaningfully assess a
target work‘s creative distance from its genre‘s typical work by asking
tough questions on a thick fact record.182

Convention]; see DANIEL C.K. CHOW & EDWARD LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 130 (2006) (―Originality is often thought to be
the touchstone of copyright requirements, although curiously it is not expressly mentioned in
either TRIPs or the Berne Convention.‖). Berne does refer to ―literary and artistic works,‖ Berne
Convention, supra, at art. 2(1), 1161 U.N.T.S. at 31, and ―it is generally accepted that a work
must be classified as fulfilling the criterion of originality or creativity in order to fall within the
categories of production which are within the scope of the Convention.‖ J.A.L. STERLING,
WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW § 7.06, at 337 (3d ed. 2008). Berne also states that compilations are
protectable, so long as they ―constitute intellectual creations‖ ―by reason of the selection and
arrangement of their contents.‖ Berne Convention, supra, at art. 2(5), 1161 U.N.T.S. at 34.
Indeed, at most Berne rules out the use of a ―sweat of the brow‖ test for protection, the very
standard the Supreme Court rejected in Feist. See Daniel J. Gervais, The Compatibility of the
“Skill and Labour” Originality Standard with the Berne Convention and the TRIPs Agreement,
26 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 75, 80 (2004) (―[T]he text and drafting history of the Berne
Convention unequivocally demonstrate that the property test of originality is that the work must
embody an author‘s creative input.‖). My suggestion that we demand more creativity is, of
course, plainly in keeping with the idea that we demand some creativity (rather than none)—as
Feist holds, and Berne article 2(5) implies. Like Berne, the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) provides no definition of originality or creativity for
determining copyright eligibility. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299. TRIPS article 10(2), on compilations, simply
incorporates Berne article 2(5). Id. art. 10(2), 1869 U.N.T.S. at 304. (Ditto for article 5 of the
World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Apr. 12, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No.
105-17, 2186 U.N.T.S. 152.) More generally, TRIPS article 9(1) incorporates Berne articles 1-21
wholesale. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra, at art.
9(1), 1869 U.N.T.S. at 304.
180 Common experience in the phone-book world of 1991 helped the Justices see the
originality problem in the Feist case more readily; in most domains, the accused infringer will
face a much steeper factual climb to demonstrate fatal unoriginality to a busy judge unfamiliar
with the genre in question.
181 Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (establishing categories of prior art that are used to establish a
baseline state of the art for purposes of the nonobviousness inquiry prescribed in § 103).
182 Professor Madison‘s pattern-oriented approach to fair use strikes the same note:
There is skepticism in some quarters about the competence of the judiciary to identify
and interpret social practices meaningfully. Courts certainly could do a better job of
this than they have done in the past. But the admonition that this is not a judicial
function is off the mark; weakness in decision making arises not because judges are
institutionally incapable of identifying and interpreting social practices, and in any
event, judges ordinarily ought not to be asked to do so without help. The investigation
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Hoisting copyright‘s originality standard in the patent law direction
has a benefit beyond helping us avoid now-costlier wasteful grants. A
more demanding originality standard, based on departure from the
routine and conventional, also provides a common explanatory
grounding for disparate strands of copyright doctrine that likewise deny
protection to that which is conventional, routine, or dictated by
circumstance. For example, under the scènes à faire doctrine,
―expressions indispensable and naturally associated with the treatment
of a given idea ‗are treated like ideas and are therefore not protected by
copyright.‘‖183 If one author could protect such stock expressions, ―the
net of liability would be cast too wide; authors would find it impossible
to write without obtaining a myriad of copyright permissions.‖184 On
my approach to originality, this doctrine deals with a limiting case of
plainly unprotectable, highly conventional material. Similarly, the
music copyright cases denying protection to common harmonic
progressions185 or conventional arrangements186 are music-specific
applications of a more general standard. And cases applying the merger
doctrine—under which ―even expression is not protected in those
instances where there is only one or so few ways of expressing an idea
that protection of the expression would effectively accord protection to
the idea itself‖187—are instances where the range of intelligible
conventional expression is especially narrow. Cases in which faithful

that I suggest be pursued ought, in the first instance, to be the task of the parties.
Judges rarely need to be anthropologists. Lawyers do, and they do so all the time.
Creating a proper record is, among other things, an anthropological or archaeological
exercise. A proper record goes a long way to good judicial decision making, and
having a coherent set of questions to ask goes a long way toward making a proper
record.
Madison, supra note 19, at 1640-41 (footnotes omitted). I am grateful he highlighted the point
for me.
183 Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1444 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also Walker v. Time Life Films,
Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986) (―Elements such as drunks, prostitutes, vermin and derelict
cars would appear in any realistic work about the work of policemen in the South Bronx. These
similarities therefore are unprotectible as ‗scenes a faire,‘ that is, scenes that necessarily result
from the choice of a setting or situation.‖).
184 Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 659 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.).
185 Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 23 (1st Cir. 2005) (collecting cases) (―The plaintiff has
not presented any evidence contradicting his own expert‘s assessment of the ubiquity of the III, II
harmonic progression. Virtually by definition, expressions that are common are also unoriginal.
So it is here: this harmonic progression, which is a stereotypical building block of musical
composition, lacks originality. Accordingly, it is unprotectable.‖ (internal citations omitted)).
186 Woods v. Bourne Co., 841 F. Supp. 118, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d in relevant part, 60
F.3d 978, 991-93 (2d Cir. 1995); Smith v. George E. Muehlenbach Brewing Co., 140 F. Supp.
729, 731 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
187 Kregos v. Assoc. Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991); see, e.g., New York Mercantile
Exch. Inc. v. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 497 F.3d 109, 116-18 (2d Cir. 2007); Allen v.
Academic Games League of America, Inc., 89 F.3d 614, 617-18 (9th Cir. 1996).
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depiction of an external item is the central expressive value involve that
narrowest range of conventional expression.188
Hoisting originality also embraces the insight, pioneered in the
derivative works context, that copyright protection presupposes a
material difference between the work for which an exclusion right is
sought and public domain material.189 The public domain includes
conventional, pedestrian expression for the genre (this is Feist‘s central
insight), and a too-low statutory originality standard sweeps in too much
of this material by assuming that the problem of creative distance is
limited to derivative works. The problem is not limited to derivative
works, as, for example, the Seventh Circuit has recently suggested.190
The best example of the analysis I propose would comprise a thick
factual record of contemporaneous expression in a target genre for
assessing a given work. I have not yet developed a comprehensive case
study of this type. Instead, I can offer here three illustrative items: a
trial court case that hints at an analysis along the lines I suggest, an
appellate case that passes up a seemingly promising chance to conduct
such an analysis, and a recent story about a photographer who makes
computed tomography (CT) scan images of common objects.
In Oriental Art Printing, Inc. v. Goldstar Printing Corp.,191 a
printing company that specialized in printing Chinese restaurant menus
sued another printing company for copyright infringement. The
plaintiffs asserted copyrights in, among other things, ―photographs of
several common, but unlabeled, Chinese food dishes.‖192
Acknowledging that under current originality doctrine ―[t]he required
creativity is small,‖193 the district court concluded that the food photos
were fatally uncreative. Specifically, ―as the president of both plaintiff
companies . . . concedes, [the photos] depict the ‗most common Chinese
188 See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1264-68 (10th
Cir. 2008); Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ‘g Co., 158 F.3d 674, 688 (2d Cir. 1998).
189 Entm‘t Research Group v. Genesis Creative Group, 122 F.3d 1211, 1220 (9th Cir. 1997);
Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 304-05 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.) (‖[T]he purpose of
the term [‗original‘] in copyright law is not to guide aesthetic judgments but to assure a
sufficiently gross difference between the underlying and the derivative work to avoid entangling
subsequent artists depicting the underlying work in copyright problems.‖); L. Batlin & Son, Inc.
v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976) (―We do follow the school of cases in this circuit and
elsewhere supporting the proposition that to support a copyright there must be at least some
substantial variation, not merely a trivial variation such as might occur in the translation to a
different medium.‖).
190 Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 2003)
(Posner, J.) (―Copyright law unlike patent law does not require substantial originality. In fact, it
requires only enough originality to enable a work to be distinguished from similar works that are
in the public domain, since without some discernible distinction it would be impossible to
determine whether a subsequent work was copying a copyrighted work or a public-domain
work.‖ (citations omitted)).
191 175 F. Supp. 2d 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d in part, 34 Fed. Appx. 401 (2d Cir. 2002).
192 Id. at 544.
193 Id. at 546.
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dishes used in take-out menu [sic].‘‖194 These ―direct depictions of the
most common Chinese food dishes as they appear on the plates served
to customers at restaurants,‖ the district court found, ―lack any artistic
quality, and neither the nature and content of such photographs, nor
plaintiffs‘ description of their preparation, give the Court any reason to
believe that any ‗creative spark‘ was required to produce them.‖ 195 The
analysis in this case is on the right track, because it links creativity with
a departure from convention. Finding none, it rejects the claim to
copyrightability. It would, I think, have been better to ensure, with
example photographs from the Chinese menu item genre, that the
plaintiff‘s photos were as conventional as the trial judge supposed. But
that shortcoming is evidentiary, rather than analytical.
In a more recent dispute between two management consulting
companies,196 the First Circuit missed a good opportunity to conduct a
more searching creativity inquiry about the originality of the plaintiff‘s
management training workbooks on communication and negotiation—
an inquiry the district court had conducted, albeit awkwardly, below.
As was the case with Oriental Art Printing, one concern I have about
the state of the record in this dispute is the seeming lack of evidence
about exemplars in the genre against which to assess the asserted
copyrights. The most troubling aspect of the case, however, is the
successful use of (from my vantage point) a highly suspect copyright
claim to bankrupt a new competitor197 started by departed former
employees after their noncompetition agreements had expired.198 The
district court described plaintiff Situation Management Systems, Inc.‘s
(SMS) training workbooks, the three copyrighted works in suit, this
way:
These works exemplify the sorts of training programs that serve as
fodder for sardonic workplace humor that has given rise to the
popular television show The Office and the movie Office Space.
They are aggressively vapid—hundreds of pages filled with
generalizations, platitudes, and observations of the obvious.199

Further: ―At their creative zenith, these works translate common-sense
communication skills into platitudinal business speak.‖200 One can, if
one chooses, fairly read the district court‘s rationale for concluding that

194
195
196

Id. (quoting a witness declaration).
Id.
Situation Mgmt. Sys. v. ASP Consulting Group, 535 F. Supp. 2d 231 (D. Mass. 2008),
rev’d, 560 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2009).
197 See 560 F.3d at 58 (―The cost of defending this suit, ASP represents, has rendered it
insolvent.‖).
198 Id. at 56 (describing defendant ASP‘s formation and competitor status).
199 535 F. Supp. 2d at 239 (footnote omitted).
200 Id. at 241.
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the workbooks were fatally unoriginal as one, like Feist, focused on the
utter banality and conventionality of the works.
The First Circuit, for its part, rejected the district court‘s analysis
as erroneous self-indulgence in personal aesthetics and improper
reliance on patent law concepts. According to the First Circuit, the trial
judge,
erroneously treated copyright law‘s originality requirement as
functionally equivalent to a novelty standard. . . . Moreover, the
district court‘s originality analysis was obviously tainted by its own
subjective assessment of the works‘ creative worth. Its assessment
of originality displayed nothing but pejorative disdain for the value
of SMS‘s works. . . . Yet neither the works‘ absolute novelty nor
their creative value determines whether they are original for purposes
of copyright protection.201

―Pejorative disdain‖ would, of course, be cause for concern. But I
see no more disdain in the trial court‘s rejection of banal workbooks
than in the Supreme Court‘s rejection of banal white pages. The First
Circuit, though, is devoted to a low statutory originality standard:
―SMS‘s works easily satisfy the originality requirement for copyright
protection.‖202 This is a missed opportunity. The district court‘s
intuition, from first hand review of the workbooks, certainly warranted
greater analysis based on comparisons to other workbooks of the type
from the relevant time period. I concede, though, that it is not clear that
the resources existed to improve the evidentiary record on remand,
given that SMS had successfully driven defendant ASP Consulting
Group into bankruptcy.
A final example: Consider the below photograph of a common
object. It strikes me, at the outset, as unconventional expression (in
great contrast to Mr. Garcia‘s photo of then-Senator Obama). The New
York Times wrote about the photographer, ―an artist-turned-medicalstudent‖ Satre Stuelke, in March 2009.203 This particular work is
Stuelke‘s CT scan photo of a rubber duck squeak toy; Stuelke has called
it ―radiology art.‖204 According to the Times story, Stuelke manipulates
the CT scanner‘s ―200 to 500 image slices‖ with ―a computer program
that allows him to assign different colors to areas of different
density.‖205 My admittedly untutored view is that these photos are
unconventionally creatively expressive for a posed pop photo genre (if
that is the right genre, which it may not be). The ultimate assessment

201
202
203

560 F.3d at 60.
Id. (emphasis added).
Amanda Schaffer, The Inner Beauty of a McNugget: A Cultural Scan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
23, 2009, at D4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/24/science/24scan.html.
204 See Radiology Art, http://www.radiologyart.com (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
205 Schaffer, supra note 203.
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turns on a properly developed set of facts, but I think Stuelke‘s photos
offer a helpful pointer toward what I suggest.

Satre Stuelke, Aug. 2008

Admittedly, the prevailing ―tiniest dash will do‖ approach to
originality has become quite ingrained in the copyright system.206
Hoisting originality will be hard, if it happens at all. Another factor
that, I suspect, adds to the difficulty, pulling down on copyright‘s
creativity threshold, is the lack of a creator‘s attribution right in U.S.
law.207 The desire to honor a creator‘s effort with credit is, in our
cultural tradition, readily felt: ―[F]ew interests seem as fundamentally
intuitive as that authorship credit should be given where credit is
due.‖208 Authors, for their part, may create with a moral right to credit
very much in mind. From my own experience, I agree with Professor
Lastowka‘s recent suggestion that ―[p]romoting personal reputation
within a particular community is certainly not the sole motivator for
open copyright production, but I would wager that it is among the top

206 See, e.g., Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2000) (―When this
articulation of the minimal threshold for copyright protection [in Feist] is combined with the
minimal standard of originality required for photographic works, the result is that even the
slightest artistic touch will meet the originality test for a photograph.‖).
207 Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and Trademarks Law,
41 HOUS. L. REV. 263, 266 (2004) (―[I]n the United States neither the copyright nor the
trademarks laws establish a right of attribution generally applicable to all creators of all types of
works of authorship.‖).
208 Id. at 264. See generally Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It’s Due: The Law and Norms of
Attribution, 95 GEO. L.J. 49 (2006).
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two.‖209 Importantly, as Professor Heymann describes, copyright
owners—and the courts that, understandably, sympathize with them—
have used copyright‘s exclusion power to achieve attribution-related
ends, lacking an attribution right for achieving those ends directly.210
Copyright‘s now-low statutory originality standard and the felt moral
claims of authors have thus become a bit entangled.
Separating attribution and originality assessments is important,
both for itself and—in my view—for removing the downward pressure
that attribution-recognition-desire puts on originality. As Professor
Kwall has explained with great clarity, an author‘s moral claim to
attribution and integrity comes from authorship itself, not from the
resulting work‘s creative distance from, or similarity to, other works in
the genre:
Although authors freely borrow from the landscape of existing
cultural production, a work of creative authorship nonetheless
manifests the author‘s individual process of creativity and artistic
autonomy. Indeed, the very act of authorship entails an infusion of
the creator‘s mind, heart, and soul into her work.211

Providing independent legal protection for attribution and integrity
claims212 thus ―reaffirm[s] the author‘s work as a reflection of its creator
and a testament to the author‘s autonomy and dignity.‖213 We can
reaffirm an author‘s sound moral claim to credit without reaching a
conclusion, one way or the other, about the work‘s compliance with the
statutory originality standard; the questions are analytically distinct.
Professor Kwall has argued that, in a framework with a low
originality standard (as we now have), ―only those works satisfying a
heightened standard of originality should qualify for [moral rights]
protection‖214:
[A] perspective of creativity grounded in inspirational or spiritual
motivations emphasizes the intrinsic dimension of the creative
process. The focus of this perspective is on the author‘s relationship
to his work and his sense of personal satisfaction or fulfillment

209 Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution: Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87 B.U. L. REV. 41,
58 (2007); see also id. at 58 n.95 (―With regard to the other contender, my personal intuition is
that the intrinsic enjoyment of creative production has always produced and will always produce
the majority of the material that copyright protects.‖).
210 Laura A. Heymann, The Trademark/Copyright Divide, 60 SMU L. REV. 55 (2007).
211 Kwall, Originality in Context, supra note 61, at 873.
212 See Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation, supra note 61, at 1972 (―The most prominent
components of moral rights laws are the right of attribution and the right of integrity. The right of
attribution safeguards the author‘s right to be recognized as the creator of her work and prevents
others from being falsely designated as the author. The right of integrity guarantees that the
author‘s work truly represents her creative personality and is free of distortions that misrepresent
her creative expression.‖).
213 Kwall, Originality in Context, supra note 61, at 873.
214 Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation, supra note 61, at 1998.
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resulting from the act of creativity itself. . . .
Moral rights
protections are designed to recognize this intrinsic dimension of
creativity. In light of these considerations, the legislative standard
for moral rights should require ―substantial‖ creativity in lieu of
Feist‘s ―modicum of creativity.‖215

On this approach, she would leave the originality standard where it is
and provide moral rights to more highly creative works. My own
intuition is the reverse: attribution and integrity rights are better directed
to protecting authors whose works fall below an appropriately more
demanding statutory originality standard for copyright protection. Even
as we raise the originality standard, we should consider providing
attribution rights to admittedly less creative, but nonetheless personally
authored, works. In any event, if courts hoist statutory originality, the
pressure to recognize counterbalancing attribution rights will surely
rise.216
CONCLUSION
Legal and technological changes have rendered copyright creation
and infringement pervasive. Originality, the gateway to copyright‘s
exclusion power, needs hoisting to avert what is now the more socially
costly error—copyright grants that are not needed to incent creation.
We can hoist originality by analogy to nonobviousness, protecting an
expressive work insofar as the author can show that the work departed
from routine, typical, or conventional expression in the pertinent genre
at the time he or she authored the work. And by doing so, we focus
copyright‘s protection on those who succeed by taking the greater risk
of investing in unconventional, unorthodox expression.
These
boundary-breaking creators, dissenters of a sort, do more to foster
progress.217 Having succeeded where others feared, or simply failed, to
215
216

Id. at 2001-02; see also Kwall, Originality in Context, supra note 61, at 874-75, 883-98.
Professor Loren notes a similar dynamic in connection with her proposal to modulate the
scope of copyright protection according to whether ―the driving motivation for the creation of
[the] works is unrelated to copyright protection.‖ Loren, supra note 40, at 2, 3, 11-12.
217 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003). Defending the
need for freedom of opinion and freedom of expression, Mill observed that, ―since the general or
prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of
adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied.‖ JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY 64 (Macmillan Pub. Co. 1956) (1859). If we focus originality on unorthodox
expression, we better align copyright with free expression values. Late in his life, Justice
Douglas offered a First Amendment meditation congenial to my project:
The struggle of man to be unafraid of ideas has marked human history. The
conventional has always plagued us; it has conditioned us to one way of thinking. Our
prejudices become rooted in folklore.
The curious man—the dissenter—the innovator—the one who taunts and teases or
makes a caricature of our prejudices is often our salvation. Yet throughout history he
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go, they are more likely to inspire destructively imitative competition.
They are the worthier claimants to copyright‘s protective power.

has been burned or booed, hanged or exiled, imprisoned or tortured, for pricking the
bubble of contemporary dogma.
The writer and the thinker are the ones who frequently show that a current attitude
is little more than witchcraft. They may do in art, in business, in literature, in human
relations, in political theory what Darwin did with biology, Freud and Jung with the
subconscious, Einstein and Rutherford with physics. This folklore or mythology by
which we all live needs challengers, doubters, and dissenters lest we become prisoners
of it. We need those who provoke us so that we may be warned of the fate that our
prejudices or ignorance or wishful thinking may hold in store for us. It was Keynes, I
believe, who said that ―the difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the
old ones.‖
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, FREEDOM OF THE MIND 32 (1964). The conventions of expression, no
less than the ideas expressed, can only benefit from the challenges that transgressions from them
offer.

